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UNDERSTANDING ABORIGINAL RIGHTS
Brian Slattery*
Toronto
The entrenchment of aboriginal rights in the Constitution Act, 1982 and the
importance of aboriginal claims now reaching the courts highlight the need to
understand these long-ignored rights. This article sets out a general theory of
the subject, drawing on the leading cases and the complex history of relations
between native peoples and the Crown . Aboriginal rights are based on a set of
basic common law principles that operate uniformly across Canada, except
where modified by treaty or legislation . Under those principles, native peoples
presumptively hold full rights to lands in their possession, and retain their
accustomed laws andpolitical institutions, including a measure ofinternal autonomy . The Crown holds, a general fiduciary obligation to protect aboriginal
peoples and their lands. Aboriginal rights have long enjoyed some constitutional protection under the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and the Constitution
Act, 1867. The recent entrenchment of these rights completes the process .
L'inclusion des droits des autochtones dans la Loi constitutionnelle de 1982 et
l'importance des revendications autochtones qui arrivent maintenant devant les
tribunaux soulignent combien il est nécessaire de comprendre ces droits restés
dans l'oubli pendant si longtemps . Dans cet article, l'auteur présente le sujet
dans ses grandes lignes en s'appuyant sur les décisions qui font autorité et sur
l'histoire complexe des relations entre les peuples autochtones et la Couronne.
Les droits autochtones ont pour base un ensemble de principes de common law
qui s'appliquent defaçon uniforme dans tout le Canada saufquand un traité ou
un acte législatify ont apporté des changements . En vertu de ces principes, les
peuples indigènes ont, de prime abord, tous les droits sur les terres qu'ils
possèdent et conservent leur droit coutumier et leurs institutions politiques y
compris une certaine autonomie domestique . La Couronne a l'obligationfiduciàry
générale deprotéger les peuples autochtones et leurs terres . Les droits autochtones
reçoivent depuis longtemps une certaine protection constitutionnelle et ceci en
vertu de la Proclamation royale de 1763 et de la Loi constitutionnelle de 1867.
L'inclusion récente de ces droits dans la Constitution ne fait que parfaire ce
développement .
Introduction

The subject of aboriginal rights is life an overgrown and poorly excavated archeological site. Most visitors are content to wander around the
*Brian Slattery, of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto, Ontario .
I am indebted to Professors John Evans, Kent Mchleil, Peter Hogg, and Michael Asch,
as well as Messrs . Bruce McLeod and John Hurley for their helpful criticisms of an
earlier version of this article . I should also like to thànk the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and Osgoode Hall Law School for making time available for research and writing. The law stated herein is as of December 31st, 1986 .
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ruins, climb to the top of the highest mound, or poke about in the dust
for souvenirs. Others, prompted by curiosity or official duty, select a
likely spot and sink a trench through the layers of historical deposits,
uncovering, perhaps, the severed foot of a colossal statue, or a worn
inscription . But the meaning of these objects is unclear. Even when they
can be identified and dated, their larger import escapes us.
It is now a century and more since excavation of this sort got underway in Canada. Some areas have been cleared and a number of curious
items retrieved, tagged, and sorted . But we still have only a dim percep
tion of the shape of the city that lies beneath our feet . More surprising,
little thought has been given to the matter . When questions arise about
the location of the city's boundaries, and the significance of its principal
structures, we are referred to confident statements made by early excavators, as if these dispensed with the need for further inquiry.
A number of factors suggest that the era of haphazard excavation is
rapidly coming to an end. Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982'
recognizes and affirms the "existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the
aboriginal peoples of Canada" . Likewise, section 25 shields from the
impact of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms2 a broader group
of rights described as "aboriginal, treaty or other rights or freedoms that
pertain to the aboriginal peoples of Canada", including those recognized by the Royal Proclamation of 1763 . These sections require courts
to confront many of the basic unresolved issues concerning aboriginal
rights .
In an important case the Supreme Court has signalled that it is
ready for the task . While not dealing directly with the new constitutional
provisions the judgment provides the stimulus and much essential mate
rial, for reflection on the fundamental nature and origins of aboriginal
rights . The case is Guerin v. The Queen .' The occasion was an action
by the Musqueam Indian band of British Columbia against the federal
government . The band possessed valuable reserve lands in the City of
Vancouver. They alleged that in 1957 the government induced them to
surrender part of their reserve to the Crown for leasing to a golf club,
with the rent to be applied to the band's account. After obtaining the
surrender from the band, the government leased the land to the golf club
I

Schedule B of the Canada Act, 1982, c. l l (U .K .) .

2 Part I (ss. 1-34) of the Constitution Act, 1982 .

3 The most accessible text is that found in R.S .C . 1970, App . 11, No . 1, but it is
not completely accurate . An accurate copy of the original printed text is given in C .S .
Brigham (ed.), British Royal Proclamations Relating to America (1911), p. 212. The
original document, as entered on the Patent Roll for the regnal year 4 Geo. III, may be
seen in the United Kingdom Public Record Office : c. 66/3693 (back of roll).
4 [198412 S.C .R . 335, (1984), 13 D.L .R . (4th)'321 (S .C .C .) . For analysis of the
decision, see: D.P . Emond, Case Comment: Guerin v. R. (1986), 20 Estates and Trusts
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for seventy-five years on terms much less favourable than the band had
agreed to, and did not even give there a copy of the lease until twelve
years later. Evidence showed that the lands were potentially among the
most valuable in Vancouver and could have commanded a much higher
rent . The band argued that the government was guilty of a breach of
trust, and asked for damages .
The government argued in reply that it was not legally responsible
to the band for what it did with their lands after the surrender. In effect,
it might have leased the lands on whatever terms it saw fit, regardless of
what it had told the band earlier. The government's only responsibility
to the band was political rather than legal.
The Supreme Court unanimously rejected the government's arguments and held it legally accountable for its adtions, awarding the band
ten million dollars in damages. Dickson J., speaking for himself and
Beetz, Chouinard and Lamer JJ., based his decision squarely on the
concept of aboriginal land rights . He held that aboriginal land title is a
legal right derived from the native peoples' historic occupation of their
tribal lands. That title both pre-dated and survived the claims to sovereignty made by European nations in colonizing North America . Although
aboriginal title was recognized in the Royal Proclamation of -1763, it has
an independent basis in Canadian common law. It entitles native peoples
to possess their homelands, until their =title is extinguished by a voluntary surrender to the Crown or by legislation. Native peoples have a
special relationship with the ,,Crown, whereby the Crown serves as an
intermediary between them and people wishing to purchase or lease their
lands. This relationship gives rise to a distinctive fiduciary obligation on
the part of the Crown to deal with surrendered native lands for the benefit of the native peoples. If the Crown fails in the performance of its
fiduciary duties it is liable in damages .
A second opinion, coming to similar conclusions, was delivered by
Wilson J., with Ritchie and McIntyre JJ. concurring . She emphasizes
that the Crown has a general fiduciary obligation to protect Indian rights
in their reserves, which is rooted in the concept of aboriginal title. The
last of the eight judges participating in the decision, Estey J., gave a
short separate opinion concurring in the result, but involving the law of
agency . s
.
Reports 61 ; J. Hurley, The Crown's Fiduciary Duty and Indian Title: Guerin v. The
Queen (1985), 30 McGill Law J. 559; W.R . McMurtry and A. Pratt, Indians and the
Fiduciary Concept, Self-Government and the Constitution : Guerin in Perspective, [1986]
3 C .N .L .R . 19 ; 1.1 . Reynolds and L.F . Harvey, The Fiduciary Obligation of the United
States and Canadian Governments towards Indian Peoples, in Indians and the Law II,
Chapter 1, Materials prepared for Continuing Legal Education, Vancouver, B.C ., January and March, 1985 .
5 The ninth member of the bench, Laskin C.J .C ., took no part in the judgment.
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The decision has a profound significance for aboriginal land claims .
In the Prairie Provinces, most of Ontario, and part of the Northwest
Territories, Indian peoples were induced to sign treaties whose written
terms provide for the surrender of their lands to the Crown. No such
treaties were signed for the Atlantic Provinces, Quebec, much of British
Columbia, and large sectors of the North. 6 In Quebec, native land claims
were partially settled by the James Bay Agreement in the mid-1970s . 7
But in many other parts of Canada native people maintain that their
rights to their traditional homelands have never been lawfully extinguished by treaty or by statute. 8 In areas where treaties were signed, it is
disputed whether the written texts faithfully reflect the oral terms of the
agreements.
The federal government has acknowledged that certain native peoples have continuing interests in traditional lands founded on use and
occupancy, and has been prepared to negotiate some aboriginal land
claims on that basis . But it has remained equivocal about the legal merits of these claims . 9 Provincial governments, whose control over natural
resources is affected, have generally been more reluctant than the federal government to acknowledge the existence of aboriginal title or to
negotiate claims based on it.
Prior to the Guerin decision, the jurisprudence on aboriginal title
had been unclear. In Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia, to
a The subject is considered in: B.H . Wildsmith, Pre-Confederation Treaties, in
B .W . Morse (ed.), Aboriginal Peoples and the Law: Indian, Metis and Inuit Rights in
Canada (1985), pp . 122-271 ; N.K. Zlotkin, Post-Confederation Treaties, ibid ., pp . 272-407.

7 The James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement (Quebec: Éditeur officiel du
Québec, 1976); embodied in S.C . 1976-77 c .32, and S.Q . 1976 c .46. See: W. Moss,
The Implementation of the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement, in Morse, op .
cit, footnote 6, pp . 684-694.

8 For general accounts, see: D. Sanders, Prior Claims : Aboriginal People in the
Constitution of Canada, in S.M . Beck and 1. Bernier (eds .), Canada and the New
Constitution, Vol. 1 (1983), pp . 225-279; P.A . Cumming, Canada's North and Native
Rights, in Morse, op . cit, footnote 6, pp . 695-744; B .W . Morse, The Resolution of
Land Claims, in Morse, op . cit, footnote 6, pp . 617-683 ; M . Boldt and J.A. Long
(eds .), The Quest for Justice: Aboriginal Peoples and Aboriginal Rights (1985) ; P.A .
Cumming and N.H . Mickenberg (eds .), Native Rights in Canada (2nd ed ., 1972).
9 See: Canada, Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, In All
Fairness : A Native Claims Policy . Comprehensive Claims (1981), which states at pp .
11-12: "Because of historical reasons--continuing use and occupancy of traditional lands
there were areas in which Native people clearly still had aboriginal interests. Furthermore these interests had not been dealt with by treaty nor did any specific legislation
exist that took precedence over these interests. . . . [Under the federal government's
1973 policy statement) the federal government was prepared to accept land claims based
on traditional use and occupancy and. . . although any acceptance of such a claim
would not be an admission of legal liability, the federal government was willing to
negotiate settlements of such claims ." (Emphasis added) .
10 [19731 S.C .R . 313, (1973), 34 D.L .R . (3d) 145. For discussion of the case, see
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decided in 1973, the Supreme Court of Canada split on the question
whether the Nishga people of British Columbia possessed aboriginal rights
to their traditional lands in the Nass River Valley . Hall J., Spence and
Laskin JJ . concurring, held that the Nishgas had a legally recognizable
title that had not been extinguished at the coming of the British Crown
or by subsequent legislation. Judson J., Martland and Ritchie JJ. concurring, seemed to accept that the hlishgas originally had some sort of
aboriginal rights to their lands, but held that those rights had been terminated
by British Columbia legislation-before Confederation. The seventh member of the court, Pigeon J., expressed no opinion on these points and
held against the Alishgas on a procedural ground . Although the decision
as a whole supported the concept of aboriginal title, the ambiguity of
Judson J.'s judgment left room for argument .
The Guerin decision ends this aspect of the controversy, with seven
of the eight judges holding that aboriginal title is a legal right that can
be extinguished only by native consent or by legislation.' 1 The effect is
to shift the burden of proof to federal and provincial governments . They
must now show that aboriginal land rights were lawfully extinguished in
the past or acknowledge their continuing existence." Where the rights
were wiped out by legislation, the decision implies that compensation
should have been paid . 13
Another important ëffect of the decision is to suggest that the Crown
has a - general trust-like obligation toward native peoples. is This ruling
has implications in a number of areas..-It provides a standard for the
interpretation of treaty promises made by the Crown to Indian peoples,
and also for interpreting legislation that affects native rights . At the
least, it opens the door to actions alleging improper Crown dealings
with reserve lands.
Most important, however, is the fact that in Guerin the Supreme
Court shows a willingness to consider the topic of aboriginal rights afresh,
and to initiate a dialogue concerning the broad principles that alone can
make sense of the subject. is The initiative comes none too soon, for
courts are increasingly being faced with large and complex aboriginal
claims . The absence of clear guiding principles has made it exceptionK.M . Lysyk, The Indian Title Question in Canada: An Appraisal in the Light of Calder
(1973), 51 Can. Bar Rev. 450; D. Sanders, The I+Tishga Case (1973), B .C . Studies (no.
19) 3 .
1, See discussion below at footnotes 70-79 .
12
13

Infra, at footnote 131 .
Infra, at footnotes 91-104 .

Infra, at footnotes 105-116.
is The same attitude permeates the Supreme Court's recent decision regarding treaty
rights in Simon v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S .C .R . 387, (1985), 24 D.L .R . (4th) 390.
14
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ally difficult for trial courts to cope with the voluminous body of historical and anthropological evidence that often characterizes such claims,
and the judgments show the strain . 16
This article represents a contribution to the dialogue that Guerin
initiates. My aim is to outline a general theory of aboriginal rights that
embraces the decision's main holdings and relates them to a broader
series of questions . The theory draws on the leading Canadian cases on
the subject, and to a limited extent on American jurisprudence . But it is
not founded exclusively on precedent. It looks beyond the confines of
the cases to the larger historical processes they reflect . The goal, then,
is to provide a map for understanding what aboriginal rights are all
about.
I will discuss first the sources and status of the doctrine of aboriginal rights . I will then focus specifically on aboriginal title to land, reviewing its main characteristics, and in particular, the ways it may be gained
and lost . The links between aboriginal lands and Reserves will then be
briefly explored . Finally, I will discuss the question of legislative jurisdiction over aboriginal rights, and the constitutional provisions protecting them from governmental intrusion.
I. Roots
The doctrine of aboriginal rights is a basic principle of Canadian common law 17 that defines the constitutional links between the Crown and
aboriginal peoples' $ and regulates the interplay between Canadian systems of law and government (based on English and French law) and
native land rights, customary laws, and political institutions . It states the
original terms upon which the Crown assumed sovereignty over native
peoples and their territories. The factual process by which this occurred
is sometimes misunderstood, and so I will briefly review it before considering its legal dimensions .
1e Witness the courts' struggles in such cases as Hamlet of Baker Lake v. Minister
of Indian Affairs, 119801 1 F.C . 518 (F .C .T .D .), and Attorney-General for Ontario v.
Bear Island Foundation (1984), 15 D.L .R . (4th) 321 (Ont . H .C .) .
17 By Canadian common law, I mean simply the unwritten law applied by Canadian courts, whether in "common law" or "civil law" jurisdictions . I do not mean
English common law, as received in certain parts of Canada . Nor do I mean the com
mon law as opposed to equity . In certain spheres (notably that of aboriginal rights),
Canadian common law operates uniformly across the country, regardless of whether the
law of the particular jurisdiction is based on French law or English law.
1$ I will use the phrase "aboriginal peoples", "native peoples", and "Indian peoples" interchangeably . The term "Indian", of course, has a narrower meaning in popular usage, but in Canadian legal usage has been employed to refer to Inuit and Metis
peoples, as well as "Indians" in the narrow sense. See references in footnote 175
below.
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A. The Coming of the Crown 19

Most native Canadian peoples were never conquered by the Crown.
From the early days of colonization, Great Britain and France advanced
claims to broad swathes of American territory, and offered to protect the
native inhabitants against the imperial designs of other European powers
and the uncontrolled inroads of settlers, traders, miners, and speculators. Initially, these claims were not backed by serious efforts to conquer or govern the lands in question, and were ignored by most Indians,
who were well able to defend themselves . 20
Small colonies of French and English settlers sprang up along the
eastern coasts of America, and extensive webs of relations developed
with near and distant median groups, until the whole offe eastern and
northern continent was affected . In early times, these relations were
usually conducted on a basis of rough equality . They generally took the
shape of formal oral treaties dealing with matters -of trade and alliance,
war and peace, the cession of lands and the drawing of boundaries,
reparation for past wrongs and promises of right-doing in future . 22 They
'9 See generally: J.T . Juricek, English Claims in North America to 1660: A Study
in Legal and Constitutional History (Doctoral Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1970) ;
B . Slattery, The Land Rights of Indigenous Canadian Peoples, As Affected by the Crown's
Acquisition of Their Territories (D . Phil . Thesis, Oxford University, Faculty of Law,
1979 ; reprinted, University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1979); J. Hurley, Children or Brethern : Aboriginal Rights in Colonial Iroquoia (Doctoral Dissertation, Cambridge University, 1985); G.S . Lester, The Territorial Rights of the Inuit of the Canadian Northwest Territories: A Legal Argument (Doctoral Dissertation, Osgoode Hall
Law School, York University, 1981); J. Stagg, Anglo-Indian Relations in North America to 1763 and an Analysis of the Royal Proclamation of 7 October 1763 (Ottawa:
Department of Indian and Northern Affairs, 1981); P.C . Williams, The Chain (LL .M .
Dissertation, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, 1982).
z° For a detailed review, see Hurley, op . cit., footnote 19 ; Slattery, op. cit., footnote 19, pp. 95-125 .
z' Among numerous works, the following deserve particular mention: A.G . Bailey,
The Conflict of European and Eastern Algonkian Cultures, 1504-1700: A Study in Canadian Civilization (2nd ed ., 1969) ; L.H . . Gipson, The British Empire Before the Ameri
can Revolution, 15 vols . (1936-1970) ; C.J . Jaenen, Friend and Foe: Aspects of FrenchAmerindian Cultural Contact in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (1976) ; F. Jennings,
The Invasion of America. Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest (1975) ; F.
Jennings, The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire (1984); R.O . MacFarlane, Indian Relations
in New England, 1620-1760: A Study of a Regulated Frontier (Doctoral Dissertation,
Harvard University, 1933); W .S . Robinson, Indian Policy of Colonial Virginia (Doctoral Dissertation, University of Virginia, 1950); A.W. Trelease ; Indian Affairs in Colonial New York : The Seventeenth Century (1960) ; B. Trigger, The French Presence in
Huronia: The Structure of Franco-Huron Relations in the First Half of the Seventeenth
Century (1968), 49 Canadian Historical Review 107.
21
Many of these are reproduced in standard printed collections of colonial documents, such as E .B . O'Callaghan (ed.), Documents Relative to the Colonial History of
the State of New York, 11 vols . (1856-1861) .
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were strongly influenced by Indian concepts and ceremonial, and were
often renewed in annual sessions .'
Britain eventually outflanked its imperial rivals . A long series of
wars with France and Spain led to treaty settlements that recognized
some of Britain's existing claims and purported to add further territories
to its domains." Some of these treaties succeeded in restraining European rivals from meddling in the areas designated, leaving Britain free
to trade and colonize there without outside interference . Others were
just a prelude to further controversy and conflict. Finally, at the Treaty
of Paris in 1763, France withdrew completely from the area now comprising Canada, allowing Britain a free hand . Indian peoples did not
sign this Treaty or its predecessors, and did not concede that European
states had the power to sign for them ."
Native Canadians could not, however, remain immune forever to
European domination . Over several centuries, and after long periods of
alliance and trade, they succumbed piecemeal to the Crown's pressure
to accept its authority, usually only when their economic fortunes and
military capacity had waned, and in the shadow of the growing power of
the settler communities .26 The pattern differed from area to area, but
generally the government gained control only in the nineteenth or twentieth centuries . In some cases, Indian groups signed formal treaties ostensibly acknowledging the Crown's sovereignty, receiving in return assurances of protection .27 In others, the process was more informal and
haphazard, and was accompanied by varying degrees of native resistance and protest. Even today, significant opposition to the legitimacy
of the Crown's rule has continued among native groups .
23

See, in particular, Williams, op . cit., footnote 19, pp . 31-68.
' Notably, the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) and the Treaty of Paris (1763). For detailed
discussion of these and other treaties, see Slattery, op . cit., footnote 19, pp . 126-190;
M. Savelle, The Origins of American Diplomacy: The International History of Angloamerica,
1492-1763 (1967) ; M. Savelle, The Diplomatic History of the Canadian Boundary,
1749-1763 (1940) .
25

(1982) .

See, D.V . Jones, License for Empire : Colonialism by Treaty in Early America

26

For illuminating accounts of this process, see, inter alia: R. Fisher, Contact and
Conflict: Indian-European Relations in British Columbia, 1774-1890 (1977) ; R. Fumoleau,
As Long As This Land Shall Last: A History of Treaty 8 and Treaty 11, 1870-1939
(1973) ; L.F .S . Upton, Micmacs and Colonists: Indian-White Relations in the Maritimes,
1713-1867 (1979) .
27 No complete printed collection of these treaties exists . Useful sources include :
A. Moms, The Treaties of Canada with the Indians of Manitoba and the North-West
Territories (1880) ; Canada, Indian Treaties and Surrenders, 3 vols . (1905-1912) ; W.D .
Hamilton and W.A . Spray (eds .) . Source Materials Relating to the New Brunswick
Indian (1976) . The written texts of these treaties must be read with a critical eye. Usually,
they were accompanied by extensive oral exchanges, which may have constituted the
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B. The Legal Effects of Crown Claims
What legal impact did the Crown's penetration of North America
have on Indian peoples? Two basic issues arise. The first is this . Were
the Crown's initial claims, coupled with acts of "discovery" and treaties
with other European states, legally sufficient to bring native groups and
their territories under the Crown's sovereignty, regardless of the degree
of factual control achieved? ®r did the Crown obtain sovereignty over
native peoples only at later stages, when they actually submitted to its
authority?
The second issue springs from the first. Assuming that the Crown
did, in some way or other, gain sovereignty over native Canadian peoples, how did this event, affect their legal position? What happened to
their laws, property rights, and political institutions? Did these disappear overnight, to be replaced by a new set of rights, and rules? Or did
théy survive the transition basically intact, or in some modified but recognizable form?
Most of this article will be taken up with the second of the two
issues, which is really a nest of distinct but related questions . The first
issue has complex historical and theoretical dimensions that cannot be
fully explored here . Both issues are, of course, legal, and cannot be
resolved simply by looking at the facts. Rules are needed to determine
which facts are relevant and to assess their significance : At least three
legal systems are available for the task : international law, the domestic
law of the claimant European state, and the domestic law of the native
people whose lands are claimed. The resolution of the issues depends in
part on which system is chosen as an initial vantage point. In this article, we will adopt the perspective of a Canadian court, rather than a
disinterested international tribunal or a native society. Our focus, then,
will be on the position in Canadian law, leaving the other perspectives
to be explored on another occasion .
The first issue may be disposed of briefly. Canadian law treats the
question of when and how the Crown gained sovereignty over Canadian
territories in a somewhat artificial and self-serving manner. To state a
complex matter simply, the courts apparently feel bound to defer to
official territorial claims advanced by the Crown, without inquiring into
the facts supporting them or their validity in international law. 28 This
judicial posture of deference is designed to leave the executive with a
relatively free hand in matters of foreign policy . So a Canadian court
will ordinarily recognize historical claims officially advanced by the Crown
true agreement. The written version was translated orally to the- Indians in a process that
allowed ample opportunity for misunderstanding and distortion .
zs Nevertheless, a court
might well take international law into account in interpreting Crown claims, so as to harmonize the two as far as possible . For discussion and
authorities, see Slattery, op. cit., footnote 19, pp . 63-65.
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to American territories as effective to confer sovereignty for domestic
purposes .
The question to be answered in the Canadian context, then, is how
much territory the Crown claimed at various stages, and for what purposes. This is a complex question, requiring a detailed and balanced
reading of the historical record, one that is sensitive to the vagaries of
state policy and ambition, and takes account of the Crown's dealings not
only with other European powers, but also with native peoples. It is not
enough to found the acquisition of the continent on some bit of puffery
in an ancient Charter. Claims advanced in one era were quietly retracted
or modified in another. What was convenient to assert in dealings with
other European powers was often prudent to deny in negotiations with
Indian groups, and vice versa. To determine the date, then ., when the
Crown unequivocally asserted sovereignty over a given sector of Canada
requires a detailed analysis of -4he evidence pertinent to that area.
Given that the Crown at some stage asserted sovereignty over native
Canadian groups, what effect did this have on their laws, land rights,
and political institutions, as seen from the perspective of a Canadian
court? This is the second of the two questions identified earlier, and it is
the one that will claim our attention throughout the remainder of this
paper. A brief summary of our response maybe given here . 29
A review of the. Crown's historical relations with aboriginal peoples supports the conclusion that the Crown, in offering its protection to
such peoples, accepted that they would retain their lands, as well as
their political and cultural institutions and customary laws, unless the
terms of treaties ruled this out or legislation was enacted to the contrary .
Native groups would retain a measure of internal autonomy, allowing
them to govern their own affairs as they found convenient, subject to the
overriding authority of the Crown in Parliament . The Crown assumed a
general obligation to protect aboriginal peoples and their lands and generally to look out for their best interests-what the judges have described
as a fiduciary or trust-like obligation . In return, native peoples were
required to maintained allegiance to the Crown, to abide by her laws,
and to keep the peace.
C. The Common Law Doctrine of Aboriginal Rights30
The Crown's historical dealings with Indian peoples were based on
legal principles suggested by the actual circumstances of life in North
The matter is considered in detail in Slattery, op . cit., footnote 19, pp . 10-62; B.
Slattery, Ancestral Lands, Alien Laws : Judicial Perspectives on Aboriginal Title (University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1983) . Compare with Lest6r, op . cit.,
footnote 19; G.S . Lester, Inuit Territorial Rights in the Canadian Northwest Territories:
A Survey of Legal Problems (Ottawa: Tungavik Federation of Nunavut, 1984) .
30 See, generally:
J. Hurley, Aboriginal Rights, the Constitution and the Marshall
3
29
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America, the attitudes and practices of Indian societies, broad rules of
equity and convenience, and imperial policy . These principles gradually
crystallized as part of the special branch of British law that governed the
Crown's relations with its overseas dominions, commonly termed "colonial law", or more accurately "imperial constitutional law" . 31
The legal principles concerning aboriginal peoples developed at the
same time as other basic doctrines of colonial law and shared essentially
the same juridical character. Many of their basic tenets can be discerned
as early as the seventeenth century in British practice in the American
colonies. They emerge more fully developed during the next century
and are reflected, if only partially, in the major Indian document of this
era, the Royal Proclamation of 1763 .2 Just as eighteenth century colonial law harboured rules governing such matters as the constitutionals.
status of colonies, the relative powers of the Imperial Parliament and
local assemblies, and the reception of English law, it also contained
rules concerning the status of native peoples living under the Crown's
protection, and the position of their lands, customary laws, and political
institutions . These rules form a body of unwritten law known collectively as the doctrine of aboriginal rights . The part dealing specifically
with native lands is called the doctrine of aboriginal title . Other parts
deal with such matters as Indian treaties, customary law, powers of
self-government, and the fiduciary role of the Crown.
The doctrine of aboriginal rights, like other doctrines of colonial
law, applied automatically to a new colony when the colony was acquired .
In the same way that colonial law determined whether a colony was
deemed to the "settled" or "conquered", and whether English law was
automatically introduced or local laws retained, it also supplied the presumptive legal structure governing the position of native peoples. The
doctrine of aboriginal rights applied, then, to every British colony that
now forms part of Canada, from Newfoundland to British Columbia.
Although the doctrine was a species of unwritten British law, it was not
part of English common law in the narrow sense, and its application to a
colony did not depend on whether or not English common law was
introduced there . Rather the doctrine was part of a body of fundamental
constitutional law that was logically prior to the introduction of English
Court (1982-83), 17 R.J .T . 403; M. Asch, Home and Native Land : Aboriginal Rights
and the Canadian Constitution (1984) ; M. Jackson, The Articulation of Native Rights in
Canadian Law (1984), 18 U.B .C .L .R . 255.

31
The point is considered in more detail in Slattery, op . cit., footnote 29, J?p.
35-36 . The origins and character of colonial law are discussed in B . Slattery, The Independence of Canada (1983), 5 Sup . Ct . L .R. 369, at pp . 375-384.

32 Supra, footnote 3. The process by which the common law principles governing
aboriginal rights developed is well-described by Strong J. in St . Catharines Milling and
Lumber Co . v. The Queen (1887), 13 S.C .R . 577, at pp . 607-616.
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common law and governed its application in the colony . Thus, the doctrine of aboriginal rights extended to New France at the time of British
conquest, even before English law was introduced in 1763, and was
unaffected by the restoration of private French law in the Quebec Act" a
decade or so later.
Not only does the doctrine of aboriginal rights apply apart from the
introduction of English common law, it limits and molds the application
of that law to native peoples, just as it limits the application of French
law to native people in Quebec . The reason is that the doctrines governing the reception of English law in "settled" colonies, and the retention
of local law (such as French law) in "conquered" colonies are themselves part of imperial constitutional law and are to be understood in
light of other imperial principles, including the doctrine of aboriginal
rights .
This consideration provides the theoretical basis for the survival of
native customary law in Canada, a phenomenom long recognized (but
not always well understood) in our courts .34 When the Crown gained
sovereignty over an American territory, colonial law dictated that the
local customs of the native peoples would presumptively continue in
force and be recognizable in the courts, except insofar as they were
unconscionable or incompatible with the Crown's assertion of sovereignty . In this respect, the rule resembles that applied in conquered or
ceded colonies, where the local law is held to remain in force in the
absence of acts to the contrary . But the rule respecting native custom
applies regardless of whether the territory is deemed to have been acquired
by conquest, cession, peaceful settlement, or in some other way. It may
be seen, then, that the doctrine of colonial law that supports the survival
of native custom in Canada is distinct from the English rules concerning
local custom in England and is governed by quite different considera-

14 Geo. III, c .83 (U .K .) . It is a matter of debate how far English law was
actually introduced in Quebec in 1763, and thus whether the Quebec Act restored or
merely confirmed French private law. See Slattery, op . cit., footnote 19 . pp . 165-174,
204-210.
33

34

See, Connolly v. Woolrich (1867), 11 L.C . Jur. 197 (Que . S .C .), (1869), 1
R.L.O .S . 253 (Que . C.A.) ; R. v. Nan-e-quis-a Ka (1889), 1 Terr. L.R . 211 (N .W .T.S .C .) ;
R. v. Bear's Shin Bone (1899), 3 C .C .C . 329 (N .W .T .S .C .) ; Re Noah Estate (1961), 32
D.L.R. (2d) 185 (N .W .T .T .C .); Re Adoption of Katie (1961), 32 D.L .R . (2d) 686
(N .W .T.T.C.) ;ReBeaulieu'sAdoption Petition (1969),3 D.L .R . (3d) 479 (N .W .T .T .C .) ;
Re Kitchooalik and Tucktoo (also reported sub nom Re Deborah) (1972), 28 D.L .R .
(3d) 483 (N .W .T .C .A .), aff'g (1972), 27 D.L .R . (3rd) 225 (N .W .T .T .C .); Re WahShee (1975), 57 D.L .R . (3rd) 743 (N .W .T .S .C .) ; Re TagornakAdoption Petition, [1984]
1 C.N .L .R . 185 (N .W .T .S .C .) ; N.K. Zlotkin, Judicial Recognition of Aboriginal Customary Law in Canada: Selected Marriage and Adoption Cases, [1984] 4 C.N .L .R . 1,
Slattery, op . cit., footnote 19, pp . 35-44.
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tions. The attempt to apply the tests governing custom in the English
County of Kent to native customs in the Canadian Northwest Territories
is misguided.
From its origins in British imperial law, the doctrine of aboriginal
rights has passed into Canadian common law, and, subject to statutory
modifications, operates uniformly across Canada." The doctrine was
inherited not only by Canada but also by the United States after the
American Revolution . A series of decisions written by Chief Justice
Marshall of the United States Supreme Court in the early nineteenth
century review the history of British dealings with native peoples in
America, and articulate certain principles implicit in those dealings . 36
These decisions perform for the doctrine of aboriginal rights what Lord
Mansfield's celebrated decision in Campbell v. Hall3' performs for other
principles of colonial law, providing structure and coherence to an untidy
and diffuse body of customary law based on official practice . The Marshall decisions are as relevant to Canada as they are to the United States,
and have often been cited in Canadian courts . 38
The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Guerin v. The
Queen, testifies to the common law foundations of aboriginal rights . In
dealing with such subjects as the existence and nature of aboriginal title,
the character of surrenders of native land, and the fiduciary obligations
of the Crown toward native peoples, the court treats the question in each
case as one of unwritten or common law that is distinctive to Canada
3s

The transformation of colonial legal principles into rules of Canadian common
law is examined in Slattery, loc. cit., footnote 31, at pp . 390-392 .
36
See, Johnson and Graham's Lessee v. McIntosh, 8 Wheaton 543 (1823) ; Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia, 5,Peters 1 (1831) ; Worcester v. State of Georgia, 6
Peters 515 (1832) . For analysis of these decisions, see, Hurley, loc. cit., footnote-30 ;
Slattery, op . cit., footnote 29, pp . 17-38; H.R. Berman, The Concept of Aboriginal
Rights in the Early Legal History of the United States (1978), 27 Buffalo L. Rev. 637 ;
J.Y . Henderson, Unraveling the Riddle of Aboriginal Title (1977), 5 Amer . Ind. L.
Rev. 75 . Fo r an excellent historical study, see J .C. Burke, The Cherokee Cases : A
Study in Law, Politics; "and Môrality (1968-69), 21 Stan. L. Rev. 500.
37

(K .B .) .

(1774), Lofft 655, 98 E.R . 848; 1 Cowp . 204, 98 E .R. 1045 ; 20 St . Tr. 239

38 To cite only a few examples, the Canadian judges in St . Catharines Milling and
Lumber Co. v. The Queen place heavy reliance on Marshall J.'s views, albeit with
varying results; see (1885), 10 O.R . 196 (Ont . Ch .), per Boyd C., at p. 209; (1886), 13
O.A .R . 148 (Ont . C.A .), per Burton J.A ., at p. 160; per Patterson J.A ., at p. 169 ;
(1887), 13 S .C .R . 577, per Ritchie C.J ., at p . 600, per Strong J., at pp . 608, 610-612,
633-634, per Taschereau J., at p. 642. Both major opinions written in the Supreme
Court in the Calder case refer to the Marshall decisions (supra, footnote 12, per Judson
J., at p. 151, per Hall J., at pp . 193-196), as does the opinion of Dickson J. in the
Guerin case (supra, footnote 4, at pp . 335-336) .
39
Supra, footnote 4.
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and exists independently of statute or executive order. The court clearly
assumes that the common law governing these matters is uniform, and
does not vary from province to province . There is no suggestion that the
law applied by the court was peculiar to the province of British Columbia, where the case arose.
The fact that the common law of aboriginal rights is uniform across
Canada means that it is not necessary for many purposes to determine
what precise territories are covered by the Indian provisions of the Royal
Proclamation of 1763 . 4° Even assuming that certain provisions do not
apply to same parts of Canada, the common law principles that the
Proclamation consolidates are in force there. The fruits of this approach
are evident in Guerin, where the court treats a rule embodied in the
Proclamation as relevant to British Columbia without finding it necessary to determine the document's precise geographical scope. 41
The Guerin decision also stands for the proposition that statutes
and other acts concerning native people should be read in the light of the
common law of aboriginal rights . In Guerin, the court adopts this approach
in interpreting the provisions of the Indian Act. 42 By implication, the
common law also provides the context for understanding treaties signed
with particular Indian bands, as well as such important constitutional
provisions as section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867,43 and sections 25 and 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 . 44
As a common law doctrine, albeit a fundamental one, the doctrine
of aboriginal rights can in principle be overriden or modified by legislation passed by a competent legislature, in the absence of constitutional
barriers. It seems doubtful whether Indian peoples initially understood
or accepted the principle that legislation could nullify their aboriginal
rights without their consent, and inconsistent Crown practice may have
4°
On the geographical scope of the Proclamation, see Slattery, op. cit., footnote
19, pp . 175-282; K.M . Narvey, The Royal Proclamation of 1763 . The Common Law,
and Native Rights to Land within the Territory Granted to the Hudson's Bay Company
(1973-74), 38 Sask . L. Rev. 123 .

41 Supra, footnote 4, per Dickson J., at pp . 376-379 (S .C .R .), pp . 334-336 (D .L .R .),
per Estey J., at pp . 392 (S .C .R .), 346 (D .L .R .) .
42 Ibid., especially at pp . 383, 384-387 (S .C .R .), 340, 341-342 (D .L.R .), per Dickson
J., and at pp . 348-350 (S .C .R .), 356-357 (D .L.R .), per Wilson J.
43

30 & 31 Vict ., c .3 (U .K .) . See discussion, infra, at footnotes 174-176, and
188-221 .

44 Supra, footnote 1 . See infra, at footnotes 222-225.
45 See, Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia, supra, footnote 10, per
Judson J., at pp . 333-334 (S .C .R .), 159-160 (D .L .R .), per Hall J., at pp . 401-404
(S .C .R .), 208-210 (D .L .R .) ; R. v . Derriksan (1976), 71 D.L .R . (3d) 159 (S .C .C .) ;
Kruger and Manuel v. The Queen, [19781 1 S .C .R . 104, at pp . 111--112, 116-117,
(1977), 75 D.L .R . (3d) 434, at pp . 439, 443; Guerin v. The Queen, supra, footnote 4,
per Dickson J., at pp . 376-377 (S .C .R .), 335 (D .L.R .) .
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contributed to the confusion. Nevertheless, the sfandard British doctrine
attributing paramountcy to Acts of Parliament has been applied . 46 The
ameliorating factor is that throughout much of Canadian history constitutional provisions have limited the power of local legislatures to affect
aboriginal rights .' ,
It is not possible here to consider the full range of doctrines associated with the concept of -aboriginal rights . We will concentrate on the
best developed of these doctrines, that concerning aboriginal land rights
(."aboriginal title"), and deal briefly in this context with the Crown's
fiduciary responsibilities .
II . Aboriginal Title: General Features
A . Basic Concepts48
From early colonial times, a system arose in North America whereby"
lands over which the Crown claimed sovereignty were divided into two
broad categories : Indian Territories, and lands governed by European
style land systems ("General Lands") . The distinction between these
categories is the key to understanding the doctrine of aboriginal land
rights .
Prior to the advent of Europeans, most of North America was actually possessed àtid used by native communities . But the map of aboriginal North America - was not completely static . Native peoples migrated
in response to such factors as war, epidemic, famine, dwindling game
reserves, altered soil conditions, trade, and population pressure . Lands
that were vacant at one period might latex be occupied, and boundaries
between groups shifted over time . The identities of the groups themselves changed, as weaker ones withered or were absorbed by others,
and new ones emerged."
Far from ending this fluidity, the coming of Europeans in some
cases increased it, as novel trade opportunities, technologies, and means
of transport upset existing alliances and balances of power and stimulated
fresh forms of competition and conflict ." The introduction of the horse
46 The genesis of the principle of Parliamentary supremacy as applied to British
colonies is considered in Slattery, loc. cit., footnote 31, at pp . 384-390.
47

See, infra, at footnotes 181-225 .
See generally, J .C . Smith, The Concept of Native Title (1974), 24 U.T . Law J.
1; Lysyk, loc. cit., footnote 10 ; Cumming and Mickenberg, op . cit., footnote 8; Slattery,
op . cit., footnote 29 ; Lester, op . cit., footnote 19 ; G. LaForest, Natural Resources and
Public Property under the Canadian Constitution (1969), pp . 108-133 ; D.W . Elliott,
Aboriginal Title, in Morse, op . cit., footnote,6, pp . 48-121 .
49 See, for example, D.G. Mandelbaum, The Plains Cree : An Ethnographic, Historical, and Comparative Study (1979), pp . 7-46 .
so Mandelbaum, ibid .; H. Brody, Maps and Dreams : Indians and
the British Columbia Frontier (1983), pp . 22-23 .
48
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and fire-arms to the western plains gave rise to new and more mobile
styles of life among the Western Indians, which ironically are often
taken to exemplify traditional Indian culture. The well-known wars of
the Iroquois against their aboriginal neighbours in the seventeenth century were related to the European fur trade ."
If European influence did not in fact stabilize native boundaries,
the Crown's assertion of sovereignty did not in law confine native peoples to the lands they happened to possess at that time and prevent them
from acquiring title to new lands in the future . The Indian 'Territories
remained as before, an area open to movement and change, where the
land rights of a native group rested on possession, and title was gained
by appropriation or agreement and lost by abandonment.
But the Crown's claim of sovereignty over the Indian Territories
had one significant legal consequence: under British law, the Crown
gained ultimate title to the soil. This flowed from the feudal character of
the British constitution, whereby the Crown was not only sovereign but
also ultimate landlord . Once a British court recognized the assertion of
sovereignty, it also attributed to the Crown a notional title to the lands
claimed."
For most practical purposes the Crown's underlying title to the Indian
Territories did not affect native property rights, which were viewed as
burdens on that title ." Neither did it affect customary native systems of
land use and tenure, which remained in force within fhe native communities and governed the relations of their members inter se . Its main
consequence was that native peoples could not cede their territories to
European states other than Britain, for to do so would have involved a
denial of the Crown's sovereign rights . Nevertheless, native peoples were
not barred from transferring lands among themselves (where native custom allowed this), and their ability to gain rights to new lands within the
Indian Territories by simple appropriation was unimpaired .
5' See, for example, G.T. Hunt, The Wars of the Iroquois : A Study in Intertribal
Trade Relations (1960) .

Sz See, Johnson and Graham's Lessee v. McIntosh, supra, footnote 36 ; Amodu
Tijani v. Secretary, Southern Nigeria, [192112 A.C . 399, at p. 407 (P .C .) ; St . Catherine's Milling and Lumber Co . v. The Queen (1888), 14 A.C . 46 (P,C .) (lower court
decisions reported sub. nom. St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen,
supra, footnote 38). For analysis, see, Slattery, op . cit., footnote 19, pp . 45-62; Slattery,
op . cit., footnote 29, pp. 17-43; K.O . Roberts-Wray, Commonwealth and Colonial Law
(1966), pp . 625-636; J.W . Salmond, Jurisprudence (7th ed ., 1924) (last edition edited
by Salmond), App. V, p. 554; D.P . O'Connell, International Law (2nd ed ., 1970), Vol.
I, pp . 403-405 .
53 The account that follows represents a distillation of the principles laid down by
Chief Justice Marshall in Johnson v. McIntosh . supra, footnote 36, as approved, most
recently, in Guerin, supra, footnote 4, per Dickson J., at pp . 376-379 (S .C .R .), 335-336
(D .L .R .) . For detailed analysis of the principles, see Slattery, op. cit., footnote 29, and
Slattery, op . cit., footnote 19, pp . 350-361 .
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Further restrictions on transfers of native lands rose from another
source . When colonies of Europeans were established in America,
European-derived land systems were introduced among the settlers. These
systems had one common characteristic . They were based on the premise that title to land in the colony, so far as the settlers were concerned,
could only be derived from Crown grant. Title to, land was thus in principle derivative . It followed that private settlers could not acquire title to
land simply by taking possession of it; neither could they gain title by
purchase from the Indians . This principle served several important purposes . It ensured that the Crown and its deputies retained control over
the pace and manner in which land was settled, and that they benefitted
from revenues flowing from land grants . It also helped to avoid friction
between settlers and Indians caused by the fraudulent practices that often
tainted private purchases of Indian lands .
The ban on cession of native lands to outside European states, coupled with the incapacity of settlers to gain title by Indian purchases,
resulted in the characterization of native title as inalienable except to the
Crown. It can be seen, however, that the inalienability of native title
applied only to dealings between Indians and non-Indians ; it did not
prevent Indians from transferring lands among, themselves. Moreover, it
did not reflect any inherent infirmity in native title . The doctrine of
inalienability was more the product of the derivative systems of title
governing the settlers than of any characteristics of native tenure ."
Thus, North American lands claimed by the Crown were initially
of two types. First, there were the Indian Territories, where the Crown
held the ultimate title and an exclusive right of purchase, and the native
peoples held rights of possession and the capacity to acquire new lands
by appropriation or agreement inter se . Second, there were the lands
that had been withdrawn from the Indian Territories and made available
for settlement ("General Lands"). Such lands were governed by Europeanstyle land systems under which title was in principle derived from Crown
grant. The Crown could of course grant them to native groups and individuals, as to anyone else. But native groups could no longer freely
appropriate them.
These two categories of lands, "Indian Territories" and "General
Lands", were at an early stage supplemented by a third category: "Indian
Reserves" . An Indian Reserve, in the sense used here, is land that has
become permanently attached to a particular group of native people .
Unlike lands in the Indian Territories, an Indian Reserve cannot be lost
sa It may also have been true that under certain native customary systems the sale
or transfer of land outside the group was unknown or forbidden. To this extent, the
restriction on alienation to private persons coincides with traditional concepts . But these
customs are not the source of the common law rule . They would, of course, have also
ruled out sales of native lands to the Crown, which is a central feature of the doctrine of
aboriginal title.
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by its title-holders simply by non-occupation or gained by another native
group simply by appropriation. By contrast with General Lands, an Indian
Reserve is governed by a sui generis body of rules similar to that governing aboriginal title .

Lands held by native peoples in the Indian Territories are the central case of "aboriginal lands", and the common law rights to such
lands constitute "aboriginal title" in its fullest sense. Virtually all aborig
inal lands in Canada, however, have at some stage been the subject of
proclamations, statutory provisions, treaties, or other acts . So long as
these acts do not extinguish aboriginal title, the common law remains
the foundation of a native group's possessory rights and the land's status
as aboriginal land is not fundamentally affected . In Canada, there is no
difference in principle between "recognized" and "unrecognized" aboriginal title, such as exists in the United States . I return to this point later. 56
Aboriginal title can also exist in a modified,or attenuated form . For
example, in ceding their aboriginal lands to the Crown, native groups
have often retained the right to hunt, fish and trap in the ceded area,
subject to certain conditions . These rights are best understood as residual portions of the bundle of rights that constitutes aboriginal title. They
are thus sui generis property rights, similar but not identical to the profit
d prendre known to English law .57
B . Aboriginal Title and Customary Land Rights
The doctrine of aboriginal land rights does not originate in English
or French property law, and it does not stem from native custom . It is
55

The definition of Reserves given here reflects the position at common law, and
is not intended to correspond to the various statutory definitions given of Reserves . For
discussion, see below at footnotes 165-171 .
56
See below, at footnotes 93-104; and see Dickson J. in Guerin, supra, footnote 4,
at pp . 379 (S .C .R .), 336-337 (D .L .R .): "It does not matter, in my opinion, that the
present case is concerned with the interest of an Indian band in a reserve rather than with
unrecognized aboriginal title in traditional tribal lands . The Indian interest in the land is
the same in both cases: see Attorney Generalfor Quebec v. Attorney Generalfor Canada
[1921] 1 A.C . 401, at pp . 410-411 (the Star Chrome case)." And for discussion of the
distinction between "recognized" and "unrecognized" Indian title in American law,
see, F.S . Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law (1982 ed .), pp . 471-499; D.G . Kelly,
Indian Title: The Rights of American Natives in Lands They Have Occupied Since Time
Immemorial (1975), 75 Col. Law Rev. 655.
57
See K.M . Lysyk, The Unique Constitutional Position of the Canadian Indian
(1967), 45 Can . Bar Rev. 513, at pp . 518-519; A. Jordan, Government, Two -Indians, One (1978), 16 Osg. Hall L.J . 709, at pp. 718-719. The issue whether a native
hunting right is a personal right or an interest in land was left open by the Supreme
Court of Canada in Dick v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C .R . 309, at p. 315, (1985), 23
D.L.R . (4th) 33, at p. 51 . In Bolton v. Forest Pest Management Institute (1985), 21
D.L .R . (4th) 242, at pp. 248-249 (B .C .C .A .), it was held that a registered trapline may
constitute a profit d prendre.
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an autonomous body of law that bridges the gulf between native systems
of tenure and the European property systems applying in the settler communities. It overarches and embraces these systems, -without forming
part of them.s8 As Dickson 9 . recognizes in the Guerin case, aboriginal
land rights are thus sui generis. 59

What role, then, does native custom play in this scheme? The answer
lies in the fact that, while the doctrine of aboriginal land rights governs
the title of a native group considered as a collective unit, it does not
regulate the rights of group members among themselves . Subject, always,
to valid legislation, the latter are governed by rules peculiar to the group,
as. laid down by custom or internal governmental organs .
Thus, the doctrine of aboriginal land rights attributes to native groups
a collective title with certain general features . The character of this collective title is not governed by traditional notions or practices, and so
does not vary from group to group . However, the rights of individuals
and other entities within the group are determined inter se, not by the
doctrine of aboriginal title, but by internal rules founded on custom .
These -rules dictate the extent to which any individual, family, lineage,
or other sub-group has rights to possess and use lands and resources
vested in the entire group . 6° The rules have a customary base, but they
are not for that reason necessarily static . 61 Except to the extent they may
be otherwise regulated -by statute, they are open to both formal and
informal change, in accordance with shifting group attitudes, needs, and
practices .
These considerations explain why it is possible for a native group
to hold aboriginal title to lands at common law even if it has no traditional
notions of private land ownership. So long as the group meets the require58

Compare with Smith, loc. cit., footnote 48 . Supra, footnote 4, at pp . 379-382 (S .C .R.), 337-339 (D .L .R .) .
6°
The position parallels that described by the Privy Council in Amodu Tijani v.
Secretary, Southern Nigeria, supra, footnote 52, at pp . 403-404: "In India, as in Southern Nigeria, there is yet another feature of the fundamental nature of the t1de to land
which must be borne in mind . The title, such as it is, may not be that of the individual,
as in this country it nearly always is in some form, but may be that of a community.
Such a community may have the possessory title to the common enjoyment of a usufruct, with customs under which its individual members are admitted to enjoyment, and
even to aright of transmitting the individual enjoyment as members by assignment inter
vivos or by succession . To ascertain how far this latter development of right has progressed involves the study of the history of the particular community and its usages in
each case . Abstract principles fashioned a priori are of but little assistance, and are as
often as not misleading ." This passage was cited by Hall J. in Calder, supra, footnote
10, at pp. 355 (S .C .R .), 175 (D .L .R .), and the decision itself was referred to with
approval by Dickson J. in Guerin, supra, footnote 4, at pp . 378 (S .C .R .), 336 (D .L .R .) .
61
On the mutability of native custom, see the remarks of Sissons J. in Re Noah
Estate, supra, footnote 34, at p. 197.
59
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ments of the doctrine of aboriginal land rights, notably the requirement
of actual use and possession, it holds a collective title . The fact that
group custom does not acknowledge private ownership may be relevant
in determining the rights of individual group-members, but it does not
affect the title of the group as a whole .
The same considerations suggest that aboriginal land rights are not
confined to "traditional" uses of land .62 The doctrine of aboriginal title
attributes to a native group a sphere of autonomy, whereby it can deter
mine freely how to use its lands. Its decisions may be influenced, of
course, by "traditional" notions, but the stronger influence in the end
will likely be current needs and attitudes . For most native groups, land
use is a matter of survival not nostalgia. 63
Some courts, however, have expressed the view that a native group
is permanently limited in its use of aboriginal lands to customary prac-.
tices followed at a distant historical period, such as the time the Crown
first acquired sovereignty. 4 On this supposition, aboriginal title is like
an historical diorama in a museum . Here a smiling native strips birchbark from a tree, there a warrior aims bow and arrow at a mildewed
deer, while in the corner a youngster plucks plastic blueberries from a
withered bush . We must, of course, disregard the next display, where
Indians under the stern but kindly eye of a black-robed missionary plant
their first crop of corn. Agriculture, if not practiced aboriginally, is
forbidden. The difficulty with this conception, of course, is that native
people are not waxen figures on display for tourists, but living people
who depend on the land for their livelihood. Any rule that would hold
them in permanent bondage to ancient practices must be regarded with
scepticism .
The history-bound view apparently draws on English rules under
which a party asserting a customary right must show that the custom has
existed from "time immemorial", which, for curious reasons, is associ
ated with the year 1189 . 65 The analogy, however, is inappropriate. As.
62
This appears to be the position in United States law; see, for example, United
States v . Shoshone Tribe of Indians, 304 U.S . 111 (1938) ; United States v . Klamath
Indians, 304 U.S . 119 (1938) ; F.S . Cohen, Original Indian Title (1947-48), 32 Minn .
Law Rev. 28, at pp . 54-55; Cohen, op . cit., footnote 56, p. 491 .
63
For a compelling account of what may happen to a native group when its relationship to the land is abruptly disrupted by outside forces, see, A.M . ShkiInyk, A- Poison Stronger Than Love : The Destruction of an Ojibwa Community (1985) . It is
significant that many of the land uses affected in that case were not fully "traditional"
(in the sense of pre-European) .

64
Hamlet bfBaker Lake v. Minister of Indian Affairs, supra, footnote 16, at p.
559; Attorney General for Ontario v. Bear Island Foundation, supra, footnote 16, at
pp . 354-361 .
65 See,
for example, R.M . Megarry and H.W .R. Wade, The Law of Real Property
(5th ed., 1984), pp . 849-850, where the authors note, nevertheless, that it is not a fatal
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we have seen, the doctrine of aboriginal rights is not derived from rules
applying in England, but arose in response to quite different conditions .
Indeed, it would have been contrary to imperial interests in America to
confine native land uses to those existing at the time of contact. The
European fur trade, which was central to the development of Canada,
-depended on the activities of native hunters and trappers whose practices
had changed considerably since pre-European times. When colonial
officials, in other contexts, urged certain native groups to abandon "their
wandering ways" and to take up farming, they were not sanctioning an
unlawful user of land.
We must guard against the notion that native societies are essentially static in nature, that the only true aboriginal land uses are those
that were practised "aboriginally" . In fact, of course, native societies
have never been static, and have often been characterized by an ability
to adapt to shifting circumstances in a highly flexible manner. Without
this flexibility, they would have had little chance of survivâl . 67 Significant changes in life-style occurred from time to time among many groups
in pre-European times, and further changes took place in response to
European contact . But such adaptations did not entail the abandonment
of a group's essential identity .
The better view, then,. is that aboriginal title gives native people the
right to exclusive use and possession of their land, and the right "to use
it according to their own discretion". The latter words were adopted in
the Guerin case," and should be taken as'a rejection of the theory restricting aboriginal title to historically-based practices." It follows that aborigobjection "that the nature of the custom has changed with the times; for example, an
ancient custom to play games has been held to cover cricket, `although it is reasonably
certain that cricket was unknown until long after the time of Richard I"'.
66 Thus, Mandelbaum, op . cit ., footnote 49, p. 20, writes : "The advent of the
Hudson's Bay Company marked the opening of a new phase in4ribal fortunes . . . Both
the tribal culture and locale changed greatly under the influence of the English. The
culture naturally altered with the influx of European goods and with the shift of occupational emphasis from food gathering to fur trapping during certain seasons of the year .
The locale was enlarged because the traders sent the natives deeper and deeper into the
back country to collect furs from the different tribes and to trap in virgin territory."

The point is made by Brody, op . cit., footnote 50, pp . 21-30, 85-86, 247.
Per Dickson J., supra, footnote 4, at pp . 378 (S .C.R.), 336 (D .L .R .), quoting a
passage from Johnson and Graham's Lessee v. McIntosh, supra, footnote 36, at p. 574.
The same passage is quoted with approval by Hall J. in the Calder case, supra, footnote
10, at pp . 381-382 (S .C .R.), 194 (D .L .R .), who reiterates at pp . 383 (S .C .R .), 195
(D .L .R .) that "the aborigines of newly-found lands were conceded to be the rightful
occupants of the soil with a legal as well as a just claim to retain possession of it and to
use it according to their own discretion . . ." .
69 This conclusion gains further support from the cases holding that title to Indian
Reserves is presumptively the same as aboriginal title, for it has never been thought that
Indians can only use their Reserves in ways known to them in pre-contact times. See the
67
68
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inal title includes all possible uses of land, including the right to exploit
its non-renewable natural resources, unless the title has been abridged
by treaty or legislation . So far as the doctrine of aboriginal rights is
concerned, a native group that in the past lived mainly by hunting, fishing, and gathering may now turn its lands to farming, ranching, tourism, or mineral development.
C . Aboriginal Title as a Property Right
Aboriginal title is a legal right, recognizable in the courts and maintainable against the whole world, including the Crown. It is not held at
the Crown's pleasure, and cannot be extinguished normally by a unilat
eral exercise of Crown prerogative without recourse to Parliament .70 Thus,
at common law a Crown grant of lands burdened by aboriginal land
rights does not extinguish those rights . The grant takes effect subject to
them, or is invalid if it unequivocally purports to nullify them.
Prior to the Guerin decision, it was uncertain whether aboriginal
title could, be extinguished by prerogative act.7' In St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber Co . v. The Queen ," the Privy Council said that Indian
title held under the Proclamation of 1763 was "dependent upon the
good will of the Sovereign" . The statement was not explained and was
not necessary to the decision. Nevertheless, it implied that Indian title
was something like a mere licence to use the land, which the Crown
could unilaterally revoke at any time by executive act. 73
However, in the Calder case, the Supreme Court moved in the
direption of recognizing aboriginal title as a full legal right. Although
text infra, at footnote 171 . See also Simon v . The Queen, supra, footnote 15, at pp .
402-403 (S .C .R .), 402403 (D .L .R .) . There the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the
argument that a right to hunt "as usual" embodied in an Indian treaty was limited to
hunting for purposes and by methods usual in 1752, the date the treaty was concluded.
Dickson C.J .C . stated that "the inclusion of the phrase `as usual' appears to reflect a
concern that the right to hunt be interpreted in a flexible way that is sensitive to the
evolution of changes in normal hunting practices" .
7°
Except in exceptional situations, as in a conquered or ceded colony, where the
Crown has prerogative powers of legislation before a local assembly is summoned ; Campbell
v. Hall, supra, footnote 37 . We are not considering here the case where the Crown
exercises powers conferred by statute as distinct from the royal prerogative ; see text,
infra, at footnotes 146-153, 156-157.
71
See, for example, R . v. Isaac (1975), 13 N.S .R . (2d) 460, at pp . 476, 479
(N .S .A .D .), per MacKeigan C.J . ; LaForest, op . cit., footnote 48, pp . 159-160 .'
72

Supra, footnote 52, at p. 54 .
Other interpretations of the Privy Council's words have been taken, notably that
the Crown could express its will concerning native title only through legislation; see
Mathias v. Findlay, [1978] 4 W.W .R . 653 (B .C .S .C .) . For discussion of the question
whether the Proclamation of 1763 can be amended by the Crown under the prerogative,
see Slattery, op . cit., footnote 19, pp . 319-328 .
73
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Judson J. merely repeats the Privy Council's statement
a well-defined position . He writes :75

749
7'

Hall J. adopts

. . . when the Nishga people came under British sovereignty . . . they were entitled to assert, as a legal right, their Indian title. It being a legal right, it could not
thereafter be extinguished except by surrender to the Crown or by competent legislative authority, and then only by specific legislation.

By implication, then, Indian title could not be extinguished by a unilateral exercise of the prerogative.
This position was endorsed by the Supreme Court in Guerin . Dickson
J. writes that in the Calder case "this Court recognized aboriginal title
as a legal right derived from the Indians' historic occupation and pos
session of their tribal lands", noting that "Judson and Hall JJ. were in
agreement. . . that aboriginal title existed, .in Canada (at least where it
has not been extinguished .by appropriate legislative action). . ." . 76 He
goes on to adopt the view that the Indians were "the rightful occupants
of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it,
and to use it according to their own discretion." . 77
In her separate,opinion in Guerin, Wilson J. explicitly holds that
the Indian interest `cannot be derogated from or interfered with by the
Crown's utilization of the land for purposes incompatible with the Indian
title unless, of course, the Indians agree" . 7s In an important passage,
she observes : 79
It seems to me that the "political trust" line of authorities is clearly distinguishable from the present case because Indian title has an existence apart altogether
from s. 18(1) of the Indian Act. It wouldfly in theface of the clear wording of the
section to treat that interest as terminable at will by the Crown without recourse
by the Band .

It might be thought obvious that, as a legal right to the exclusive
possession of land maintainable against the world, aboriginal title is a
property right. Yet this conclusion has sometimes been doubted ." Once
74

Supra, footnote 10, at pp :-328 (S .C.R .), 156 (D .L .R .), Mardand and Ritchie JJ .
concurring .
75
76

Ibid ., at pp . 402.(S.C .R .), 208 (D .L .R .), Spence and Laskin JJ. concurring .

Supra, footnote 4, at pp . 376-377 (S .C.R .), 335 (D .L .R .) . (Emphasis added) . It
may be noted that this statement does not take account of Judson J.'s ambiguity on the
question of extinguishment.
Ibid., at pp . 378 (S .C .R .), 336 (D .L.R .), quoting from the judgment of Marshall C.J, of the United States Supreme Court in Johnson and Graham's Lessee v.
McIntosh, supra, footnote 36, at p. 574 . The first portion of the quotation is italicized in
Dickson J.'s judgment . At several other points, Dickson J. emphasizes that aboriginal
title is a legal right; see, for example, at pp . 378 (S .C .R .), 336, 339 (D .L .R .) .
77

577 .

78 Ibid ., at pp. 349 (S.C .R .), 357 (D .L .R .) .
79 Ibid.,
at pp . 352 (S .C .R .), 359 (D .L .R .) . (Emphasis added) .
8° . See Hamlet ofBaker Lake v. Minister of Indian Affairs, supra; footnote 16, at p.
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again, the confusion stems in part from the St. Catherine's case, where
the Privy Council, in an unfortunate phrase, described Indian title as a
"personal and usufructuary right" ." This might be taken to mean that
Indian title is not a property right but a right held in some personal
capacity against the Crown. However, this interpretation was effectively
discounted in the Star Chrome 82 case, where the Privy Council explained
that Indian title is "a personal right in the sense that it is in its nature
inalienable except by surrender to the Crown" . The Supreme Court adopts
the same view in Guerin, thereby laying any doubts to rest ."
Nevertheless, it could be argued that, since property is characteristically alienable, the restrictions on the transfer of aboriginal title prevent it from being truly proprietary in nature . This is an overly rigid
view . While there may be grounds in English law for linking property
with alienability, there seems to be no compelling reason for identifying
the two in principle. 84 In any case, aboriginal title is not a concept of
English land law but a sui generis right. The restrictions on its transfer
stemmed historically from the need to accommodate the rule, binding on
settlers, that title to land flows from the Crown ." These restrictions are
only partial, for aboriginal title may in fact be alienated to the Crown,
and possibly to other native groups .
Properly understood, the St. Catherine's case stands for the proposition that Indian title is an interest in land . The Privy Council holds that
Indian title is an "Interest other than that of the Province" in lands
allotted to a province by the Constitution Act, 1867, within the meaning
si Supra, footnote 52, at p. 54 . The usefulness of this phrase was doubted by
Judson J. in the Calder case, where he remarked with reference to the question of Indian
title that "it does not help one in the solution of this problem to call it a `personal or
usufructuary right"'; supra, footnote 10, at pp . 328 (S .C .R .), 156 (D .L .R .) . Significantly, the Privy Council itself disclaimed any intention of giving a comprehensive
definition of Indian title (at p. 55): "There was a great deal of learned discussion at the
Bar with respect to the precise quality of the Indian right, but their Lordships do not
consider it necessary to express any opinion upon the point."
sz Attorney General for Quebec v. Attorney General for Canada, [1921] 1 A.C .

401, at p. 408, (1920), 56 D.L .R . 373, at p. 377 (P .C .) .

83
Dickson J . states : " . . . the sui generis interest which the Indians have in the
land is personal in the sense that it cannot be transferred to a grantee. . . "; supra,
footnote 4, at pp . 382 (S .C .R .), 339 (D .L.R .) . See also Smith v. The Queen, [19831 1
S.C .R . 554, at p. 571, (1983), 147 D.L .R . (3d) 237, at p. 251 .
84
Lysyk, toe. cit., footnote 10, at p. 471 notes: " . . . restrictions on alienation are
familiar to recognized interests in land at common law, for example, in leases or in
estates in fee tail . As one writer has observed, at English common law there were times
when most of the land in England could not be sold to anyone ." (footnotes omitted) .
85 See discussion in text, supra, footnotes 52-54.
86 See the remarks in the Star Chrome case, quoted in text, supra, at footnote 82,
and discussion in text following footnote 53, supra.
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of section 109 of the Act. 8" Thus, a Province holds only the underlying
title to any lands affected by aboriginal title, until the title is surrendered
to the Crown, at which point the lands become available to the Province
as a source of revenue . As the Privy Council later observed, the phrase
an "Interest other than that of the Province" in section 109 denotes
"some right or interest in a third party, independent of and capable of
being vindicated in competition with the beneficial interest of the old
province" ." It follows that Indian title is an interest in land, independent of and opposable to the Crown's underlying title, which it burdens.
The same view permeates the terminology used in the Guerin case .
Dickson J . speaks of the existence of "aboriginal, native, or Indian
title", and of the "fact that Indian bands have a certain interest in lands",
later describing the title as "a unique interest in land" . Estey J. refers to
"the rights of the native population in those lands to which they had a
longstanding connection", and Wilson J. to "the aboriginal title of Canada's Indians" . 89
D. Aboriginal Title as a Compensable Right
The fact that aboriginal title is an interest in land means that it
benefits from the common flaw presumption favouring the payment of
just compensation upon a compulsory taking ." In the absence of clear
words to the contrary, statutes that unilaterally extinguish aboriginal land
rights should be interpreted as providing for compensation . 91
The concept that aboriginal title is a Compensable right is not a
refinement of modern jurisprudence . It is an intrinsic part of the characterization of aboriginal title found in the Royal Proclamation of 1763 .1
Indian lands are defined there as "such Parts of Our Dominions and
Territories as, not having been ceded to, or purchased by Us, are reserved
to them . . ." . The Crown provides that "if, at any Time, any of the

58 .

$7 "St . Catherine's Milling and Lumber Co . v . The Queen, -supra, footnote 52, at p.

88 Attorney Generalfor Canada v. Attorney Generalfor Ontario, [18971 A.C . 199,
at pp . 210-211 (P .C .) .
89 Supra, footnote 4, at
pp , 349, 376, 382, 392 (S .C .R .), 334, 339, 346 and 356
(D .L .R .) .
9°
See, for example, Manitoba Fisheries Ltd. v. The Queen, [1979) 1 S.C .R . 101,
[19781 6 w.w.R . 496; Attorney General v. De Keyser's RoyalHotel Ltd., [19201 A.C .
508 (H .L .) .
9' do Paul v. Canadian Pacific Ltd. (1983), 2 D.L.R. (4th) 22 (N.B .C.A .), LaForest,
J.A . states at p. 34 : "when a taking is, in fact, authorized by statute, it is presumed that
compensation will be paid. . . . This, like the presumption against taking, must apply
with additional force to the taking of Indian lands because this affects the honour and
good faith of the Crown." For discussion, see B. Slattery, The Constitutional Guarantee
of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights (1982-83), 8 Queen's Law J. 232, at pp . 270-273.
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said Indians should be inclined to dispose of the said Lands, the same
shall be purchased only for Us, in Our Name, at some publick Meeting
or Assembly of the said Indians to be held for that Purpose . . ." .92
Aboriginal title is thus portrayed as a valuable interest in land normally
acquired by purchase . It - follows that, where the Crown does not buy
Indian lands for a mutually-agreed price but expropriates them, the act
will be governed by the normal presumption requiring payment of just
compensation .
Canadian law differs on this point from that of the United States . In
Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 93 the Supreme Court held that
Indian title is not a property right within the meaning of the Fifth Amend
ment so as to require compensation to be paid for a Congressional taking, unless Congress had previously recognized that the Indians were
legally entitled to occupy permanently the lands in question . This holding posits that "unrecognized" Indian title is not a legal right but merely
permissive occupation of land .94 Thus, the court observes that the "manner, method and time" of the extinguishment of Indian title "raise political not justiciable issues" ; 95 that "Indian occupation of land without
government recognition of ownership creates no rights against taking or
extinction by the United States protected by the Fifth Amendment or
any other principle of law" ;96 that even when Indians ceded their lands
to the government by treaty "it was not a sale but the conquerors' will
that deprived them of their land" ; 9 ' and that monies given for the termination of Indian occupancy are "gratuities" rather than "compensation
for its value" . 9s
The Tee-Hit-Ton decision has attracted strong criticism . 99 For our
purposes, it is sufficient to note that the Supreme Court of Canada in the
Guerin case takes a markedly different view ." As just seen, the judges,_,__
hold that aboriginal title is "a unique interest in land" 1° ' and an "inde92

(Emphasis added) .

93 348 U.S . 272 (1955) .

94
95

Ibid., at pp . 278-279.

Ibid ., at p. 281, quoting United States v. Santa Fe Pacific Railroad, 314 U.S .
339, at p. 347 (1941) .
96 Ibid., at p. 285 .
97

98

Ibid., at p. 290.

Ibid., at p. 291 .
See, for example, Henderson, loc. cit., footnote 36, at pp . 109-122. For analysis, see Kelly, loc. cit., footnote 56, at p. 664 ff.
99

1°° In this respect, then, the Guerin decision effectively confirms the view of Hall
J . in Calder, supra, footnote 10, at pp . 352, 385-386 -(S :C .R .), 173, 196-197, 219
(D .L.R .), in preference to the view apparently taken by Judson J., at pp . 343-344
(S .C .R .), 166-168 (D .L .R .) .
101 Supra, footnote 4, at pp . 382 (S .C .R .), 339 (D .L .R .), per Dickson J.
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pendent legal right",' 02 that the manner of its extinction raises justiciable not merely political issues, '03 and that it cannot be terminated at the
will of the Crown. 104 The same conclusions spring naturally from a review
of historical Crown practice in extinguishing Indian title .
E. The Crown's Fiduciary Role respecting Native Lands '05
The Crown has a general fiduciary duty toward native people to
protect them in the enjoyment of their aboriginal rights and in particular
in the possession and use of their lands . This general fiduciary duty has
its origins in the Crown's historical commitment to protect native peoples from the inroads of British. settlers, in return for a native undertaking to renounce the use of force to defend themselves and to accept
instead the protection of the Crown as its subjects . In offering its protection, the Crown was animated less by philanthropy or moral sentiment
than by the need to establish peaceful relations with peoples whose friendship was a source of military and economic advantage, and whose enmity
was a threat to the security and prosperity of the colonies. The sources
of the general fiduciary duty do not lie, then, in a paternalistic concern
to protect a "weaker" or "primitive" people, as has sometimes been
suggested, but rather in the necessity of persuading native peoples, at a
time when they still had considerable military capacities, that their rights
would be better protected by reliance on the Crown than by self-help. 106
This fact is reflected in the Royal Proclamation of 1763, which
states that "it is just and reasonable, and essential to Our Interest and
the Security of Our Colonies, that the several Nations or Tribes of Indi
ans, with whom We are connected, and who live under Our Protection,
should not be molested or disturbed in the Possession of such Parts of
Our Dominions and Territories as, not having been ceded to, or purchased by Us, are reserved to them, or any of them, as their Hunting
Grounds" ."' One manifestation of this general duty of protection is the
Proclamation's prohibition of private purchases of Indian lands . But the
same duty of protection underlies the Proclamation's other Indian proat pp . 378 (S .C .R.), 336 (D .L .R .), per Dickson J.
at pp . 375, 378-379 (S .C .R .), 334, 336 (D .L.R .), per Dickson J. ; at pp .
350-352 (S .C .R .), 357-359 (D .L .R .), per Wilson J.
104 Ibid.,
at pp . 350, 352 (S .C .R .), 357, 359 (D.L .R .), per Wilson J.
102
103

Ibid.,
Ibid .,

105 See,
generally, Note : Rethinking the Trust Doctrine in Federal Indian Law
(1984-85), 98 Ilarv . Law Rev . 422; R.P . Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians (1974-75), 27 Stan . Law Rev . 1213 .
106 Paternalistic attitudes
became more prevalent in Canada during the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries, but, by and large, they did not characterize British-Indian relations of the formative period 1600-1800 ; see the remarks of Strong J. in St. Catharines
Milling and Lumber Co . v. The Queen, supra, footnote 32, at p. 609, and generally,
Slattery, op . cit., footnote 19, passim .
107 Supra, footnote 3 . (Emphasis added) .
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visions, notably those that prohibit colonial Governors from issuing patents
for unceded Indian lands and require settlers to remove themselves from
such lands.
The Guerin decision, while dealing only with the particular fiduciary relations created by a surrender of Indian lands to the Crown,
suggests that a more general fiduciary duty exists that informs and explains
those relations .'" Estey J. observes that the Constitution and the various
laws concerning Indians before and after Confederation "all reflect a
strong sense of awareness of the community interest in protecting the
rights of the native population in those lands to which they had a
longstanding connection " .'0' This protective concern, he adds, underlies the long-standing rule that native lands can only be alienated to the
Crown .
Dickson J . also draws attention to this restriction on alienation and
states his view of its significance in the following passage:"'
The purpose of this surrender requirement is clearly to interpose the Crown between
the Indians and prospective purchasers or lessees of their land, so as to prevent the
Indians from being exploited. This is made clear in the Royal Proclamation itself,
which prefaces the provision making the Crown an intermediary with a declaration
that "great Frauds and Abuses have been committed in purchasing Lands of the
Indians, to the great Prejudice of our Interest and to the great Dissatisfaction of the
said Indians. . ." .

He goes on to say that the Indian Act confirms "the historic responsibility which the Crown has undertaken, to act on behalf of the Indians so
as to protect their interests in transactions with third parties" ."'
Wilson J. explicitly recognizes the existence of a general fiduciary
responsibility to protect Indian lands. She states that when section 18 of
the Indian Act' 12 directs that reserves be held by the Crown for the use
and benefit of the bands for which they are set apart, this is "the acknowledgment of a historic reality, namely, that Indian bands have a beneficial interest in their reserves and that the Crown has a responsibility to
protect that interest and make sure that any purpose to which reserve
land is put will not interfere with it" . I13
It is important to understand that the possessory rights of native
groups in aboriginal lands both precede and are logically distinct from

ios The view that the fiduciary duty recognized in Guerin extends beyond the narrow context of surrenders receives support from Kruger v. The Queen (1985), 17 D.L .R .
(4th) 591 (F.C .A .), per Heald J ., at pp . 595-598, per Urie J., at pp . 645-647, per Stone
J., at p. 658.
1°9
Supra, footnote 4, at pp . 392 (S .C .R .), 346 (D .L .R .) .
i1o

Ibid . . at pp . 383 (S .C .R .), 340 (D .L .R .) .

"' Ibid .
112

R.S .C . 1970, c. 1-6.
its Supra, footnote 4, at pp . 349 (S .C .R .), 356-357 (D .L .R .) .
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any rights flowing from the fiduciary relationship . Aboriginal title is a
condition precedent for the existence of a general fiduciary obligation
to protect aboriginal lands; it is not the creature or product of the fiduciary relationship ."' Rather, as Dickson J. emphasizes in Guerin, aboriginal title exists apart from any executive or legislative act, "5 and, by
implication, apart from any fiduciary obligations owed by the Crown.
The Crown's general fiduciary duty binds both the federal Crown
and the various provincial Crowns within the limits of their respective
jurisdictions. The federal Crown has primary responsibility toward native
peoples under section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, and thus
bears the main burden of the fiduciary trust. 116 But insofar as provincial
Crowns have the power to affect native peoples, they also share in the
trust.
III. Aboriginal Title: Acquisition and Extinguishment
We have seen, then, that the doctrine of aboriginal land rights is a distinctive body of common law rules that governs a variety of matters
concerning aboriginal peoples and their use of lands. These matters fall
into three main areas . First, the doctrine defines the legal categories of
"Indian Territories", "General Lands", and "Indian Reserves", and determines how lands may pass from one category to another. Second, the
doctrine defines the concept of aboriginal title, and describes its general
character, and the manner in which it may be gained and lost; the doctrine also characterizes such related concepts as title to Indian Reserves,
and rights of hunting, fishing, and trapping on ceded lands . Third, the
doctrine determines the fiduciary responsibilities of the Crown regarding
native lands. In dealing with these matters, the doctrine touches upon
several topics belonging to other branches of the doctrine of aboriginal
rights, notably the status and effects of Indian treaties, and the survival
of native custom .
These subjects all merit more detailed treatment. However, in this
paper we can deal with only a few of them . Part III discusses the acquisition and proof of aboriginal title, and the ways it can be extinguished .
Part IV reviews the relationship between aboriginal title and title to Indian
Reserves, and Part V deals with the troublesome topic of legislative
authority over aboriginal rights . In discussing these matters, it will be
convenient at times to use a vocabulary borrowed from European-style
As Dickson J. observes in Guerin, ibid., at pp . 376 (S .C.R.), 334 (D.L .R .) :
"The fiduciary relationship between the Crown and the Indians has its roots in the
concept of aboriginal, native or Indian title. The fact that Indian bands have a certain
interest in lands does not, however, in itself, give rise to a fiduciary relationship between
the Indians and the Crown."
115 See Dickson J. in Guerin, ibid., at pp . 376-382 (S .C .R .), 335-339 (D.L .R .) .
114

116

See discussion, infra, at footnotes 174-176, 188-221.

756

LA REVUE DU BARREAU CANADIEN

[Vol. 66

property systems . This terminology should be understood in a broad,
non-technical sense, and not as detracting from the sui generic nature of
aboriginal title .
A . Acquisition and Proof
We saw earlier that the advent of European settlement in America
did not permanently freeze the boundaries of native territories or tie
native peoples to the lands that they happened to possess at the time .
Aboriginal title was based on possession, and so could be acquired by
appropriation and lost by abandonment. Here we will examine the process of acquisition more closely. The topic is, at present, an undeveloped
one, and awaits authoritative judicial treatment. So, we are. venturing
into relatively uncharted territory.
Nevertheless, reflection on the essential features of aboriginal title
suggests that for such title to be acquired, four criteria must be satisfied:
(1) The parties asserting aboriginal title must constitute an organized group of native people .
(2) The group must possess the lands claimed:
(3) The group must have possessed the lands for a substantial period .
(4) The lands must form part of the Indian Territories.
These criteria apply to groups asserting title on the basis of current
occupation . But they can easily be adapted for other situations, such as
where a native group asserts that it held aboriginal title in the past and
was unlawfully dispossessed . In the latter case, the criteria would apply
as of the time of dispossession.
(1) The parties asserting aboriginal title must constitute an organized
group of native people .
This criterion excludes claims advanced by individuals. Aboriginal
title as such is a collective right vested in a group. 117 It should be noted
that this does not mean that individual members of a native group can
not hold legally enforceable rights to a share in the group's collective
title under the rules in force within the group . Such rights are not, however, aboriginal title in the strict sense. The criterion also disqualifies
collections of people that lack sufficient coherence, permanence, or selfidentity to qualify as an organized group. But these requirements must
be applied flexibly, in light of the varying levels of organization found
in aboriginal societies.
The group asserting title must be of native descent . This is a matter
of degree, to be ascertained in each case . Clearly, a group is not dis117 See, nevertheless, Cramer v. United States, 261 U .S . 219, at pp . 226-230

(1923) .
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qualified by the fact that some or even all of its members are of mixed
native and non-native origins, or that others (such as spouses) have no
native blood at all.' is historically, groups composed mainly or entirely
of 1Vletis or "half-breeds" have been accepted as native groups, and this
119
fact is now recognized in section 35(2) of the Constitution Act, 1982,
which states that the phrase "aboriginal peoples of Canada", as used in
the Act, includes the Indian, Inuit and Metis peoples of Canada .
In determining whether or not a group of people qualifies as "native",
regard should be had to a variety of factors, such as : (a) the self-identity
of its members, as shown in their actions and statements, (b) the culture
and way of life of the group; (c) the existence of group norms or customs similar to those of other aboriginal peoples; and (d) the genetic
composition of the group .
(2) The group must possess the lands claimed.
The central feature of aboriginal title is that it is founded on
possession . 120 This fact must be kept firmly in mind, for there is a ten121
dency to assimilate aboriginal title to estates known to English law,
where the dominant form of title is derivative, and titles to land theoretically
can be traced back to a Crown grant. 122
English law recognizes, of course, that title to land may be gained
by adverse possession under statutes of limitation . Such a title is based
on possession rather than a grant or transfer of title . 12' A possessory title
of this kind has some points of similarity with aboriginal title. But caution is necessary in drawing analogies between the two forms in view of
the unique context in which aboriginal title arose.
11 $ See discussion in Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians v. United States,
490 F. 2d 935, at pp . 942-944 (U .S . Ct. Cl ., 1974).
"9

Supra, footnote 1 .
See, for example, the Guerin decision, supra, footnote 4, at pp . 382 (S .C .R .),
339 (D .L .R.), where Dickson J. characterizes aboriginal title as "a legal right to occupy
and possess certain lands, the ultimate title to which is in the Crown." ; and Estey J.
refers, at pp . 393 (S .C .R .), 347 (D .L .R .), to the Indians' "right of possèssion" .
121 As Viscount Haldane remarked in Amodu Tijani v. Secretary, Southern Nigeria, supra, footnote 52, at pp . 402-403: " . . . in interpreting the native title to land, not
only in Southern Nigeria, but other parts of the British Empire, much caution is essen
tial . There is .a tendency, operating at times unconsciously, to render that title conceptually in terms which are appropriate only to systems which have grown up under English
law. But this tendency has to be held in check closely." This passage was quoted with
approval by Hall J. in the Calder decision, supra, footnote 10, at pp . 354 (S .C .R .), 175
(D .L .R .) .
122 See Megarry and Wade, op . cit., footnote 65, p. 102.
120

123 See Megarry and Wade, ibid ., pp . 102-109; G.C . Cheshire and E.H . Burn,
Modern Law of Real Property (13th ed ., 1982), pp . 26-30; F. Pollock and R.S . Wright,
An Essay on Possession in the Common Law (1888), pp. 91-100 .
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In determining whether a group can be said to possess certain lands,
one must take into account the group's size, manner of life, material
resources, and technological abilities, and the character of the lands claimed.
It would be unrealistic to expect a group of hunters to possess their
hunting grounds in the same way as a farmer occupies his fields, or to
require that lands be used to their maximum potential with the best
available technology . The fact that a tract of land could be mined productively does not mean that a hunting group that exploits its renewable
surface resources is not truly in possession . 124
It is submitted that a native group need not be the sole possessor of
lands to hold aboriginal title, but may share the lands with other groups .
Two main types of sharing may be envisaged, which do not necessarily
exhaust the field. In some cases, several groups may hold a joint title to
certain lands, where there is an explicit or tacit agreement to this effect .
In other cases, the groups may hold distinct but overlapping titles that
are not the product of any true agreement. Whatever the situation, the
courts should endeavour to give effect to the actual patterns of use existing-among the groups in question, in keeping with the sui generis character of aboriginal title, rather than to impose a set of rigid and alien
requirements . 125 Otherwise there is the danger that a territory continuously used and occupied by several native peoples would be considered
vacant .
(3) The group must have possessed the lands for a substantial period.
The claimant group must show that it has an enduring relationship
with the lands in question, sufficient to defeat the claims of previous
native possessors and to resist newcomers. The requisite length of time
depends on the circumstances, but in most cases a period of some twenty
to fifty years would seem adequate . Time is less important for its own
sake than for what it says about the nature of the group's relationship
with the land and the overall merits of their claim.
The view expressed here, however, is opposed by another view,
which has won some judicial support. This theory, which may be called
the "frozen title" theory, takes two forms . In its pure form, it requires
proof that a claimant group has continuously used and occupied the
lands claimed since "time immemorial" . That date, which represents
'z4 See
Mitchel v. United States, 9 Peters 711, at p. 746 (1835), where Baldwin J.
stated with regard to the British law applying in the American colonies in 1763 : "Indian
possession or occupation was considered with reference to their habits and modes of life ;
their hunting-grounds were as much in their actual possession as the cleared fields of the
whites ; and their rights to its exclusive enjoyment in their own way and for their own
purposes were as much respected. . ."
125
Compare with the somewhat more stringent American criterion requiring joint
and amicable possession : Cohen, op . cit., footnote 56, p. 492.
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the limits of legal memory, is determined by the advent of European
sovereignty in the area . 126 In other words, it is not sufficient for the
claimant group to show that it has held the land for a substantial period
of time, even a very long period such as several centuries . So long as its
possession does not predate European settlement, its claim cannot be
sustained. Thus, in Eastern Canada, where permanent European settlements were founded in the early 1600s, native claimants would have to
prove continuous possession for over three hundred and fifty years. If
the voyages of Cabot, Verrazzano, and Cartier were accepted as starting
points, even longer periods would be required .
In its pure form, the "frozen title" theory maintains that the claimant group must itself have been in possession at the relevant date, that it
cannot inherit title from earlier occupants or tack its possession on to
theirs . But the theory could be adapted so as to allow a group to prove
that its possession is linked by conquest, cession, merger, exchange, or
adverse possession to the title of preceding groups in a chain extending
back to the relevant date . This adapted version, while allowing for more
flexibility, would still require the same kind of historical quarrying.
It may be observed that the "frozen title" theory implicitly treats
aboriginal title as a form .of derivative title based on a Crown grant. The
underlying notion is that when the British Crown or some other Euro
pean sovereign first came to North America it tacitly granted native
groups the right to use and occupy the precise lands they possessed at
that time and no others . On this premise, it follows that a claimant
group must prove an unbroken line of title extending back to the original
presumed grant, a line that links them both to the original grantees and
the original lands granted .
The basic objection to this approach is that it forces aboriginal title
into a mold familiar to English law, while disregarding the factors peculiar to its origins. Aboriginal title is located outside the feudal scheme
126
The "frozen title" theory was first put forward in the Baker Lake case, supra,
footnote 16, at pp . 557-558, 562. For the lands in question there (located in the Northwest Territories near Hudson Bay), the relevant date was held to be probably no earlier
than 1610 and certainly no later than 1670 . Curiously, the court did not explain why
possession from time immemorial was necessary to establish aboriginal title, or cite
authorities specifically supporting this position. The court refers, at p. 558, to several
cases as supporting a series of propositions laid down regarding aboriginal title, one
being the requirement in question . Although references can be found in some of these
cases to possession of aboriginal lands from time immemorial, none of the cases specifically holds that this is an essential requirement for proof of aboriginal title. Nevertheless, the Baker Lake theory was later adopted in the Bear Island case, again without
explanation: supra, footnote 16, at pp . 335, 340-341, 353, 361-362 . There are recent
American authorities explicitly rejecting the proposition accepted by the court; see the
illuminating discussion in Sac and Fox Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma v. United States,
383 F. 2d 991, at pp. 996-999 (U .S . Ct . Cl ., 1967), and Turtle Mountain Band of
Chippewa Indians v. United States, supra, footnote 118, at pp . 941-942 .
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that permeates English land law . Its basis is possession . As Judson J.
noted in the Calder case, " . . . the fact is that when the settlers came,
the Indians were there, organized in societies and occupying the land as
their forefathers had done for centuries . This is what Indian title
means . . . " .127
From the earliest days of colonization, Europeans were aware that
boundaries between native tribes and bands shifted over time. It would
have seemed strange to suggest that the founding of small European
settlements on the eastern coastline had permanently crystallized native
boundaries inland . In practice, the Crown recognized that native groups
were entitled to the lands they actually used and occupied at. any given
time, so long as their possession was not purely transitory . When the
Crown wanted to secure the cession of Indian lands, it dealt with the
native group actually occupying them.
This practice was not just a matter of administrative convenience.
To have acted otherwise would have attacked the very basis of aboriginal title and undermined the purpose it served . A "frozen title" theory
would have been a fertile source of conflict between the Crown and
Indian nations, conflict that the fragile settler communities could ill afford.
It would also have rendered official cessions of native lands insecure,
introducing doubts as to whether the native group signing the surrender
was in fact the one entitled to do so . It would have turned a substantial
number of native groups into squatters on their own lands., notably in
the Canadian Prairies, where many of the modern native occupants arrived
after the Crown's initial assertion of sovereignty. 128 Yet those same native
hunters were essential to the prosperity of the fur trade and the survival
of the Hudson's Bay Company. Finally, the theory would have frustrated the governmental policy of encouraging native self-subsistence,
barring a native group from migrating to another area when the game on
its lands was depleted, the area was devastated by fire or flood, or the
population swelled beyond the land's capacity .
It could be argued that the adapted version of the theory avoids
these pitfalls by allowing native groups to move to lands already occupied by other native peoples and acquire their title. However, this ver
sion of the theory has an odd anomaly . It holds that an Indian group that
seizes the territory of another group may acquire aboriginal title, but a
migrating group that settles on vacant lands, having failed to find some
other Indians to oust, cannot gain title no matter how long they stay
there. 129 The conqueror is rewarded and the peaceful migrant punished -.
127

Supra, footnote 10, at pp . 328 (S .C .R .), 156 (D .L .R .) .
1`$ See Mandelbaum, op . cit., footnote 49 .
129 This point
is made in Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians v . United
States, supra, footnote 118, at pp . 941-942 .
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The "frozen title" theory also has serious practical difficulties . The
requirement that title be traced back to the advent of Europeans presupposes the existence of orderly documentary records showing the location
and extent of aboriginal lands and the identity of successive native occupants. Yet documentary evidence for early periods of Canadian history
is at best fragmentary, and what little can be unearthed is often open to
varying interpretations . It is reasonable to think that the theory of aboriginal title does not entail an evidentiary requirement that normally cannot
be met. 130
The better view, then, is that a native group need only show that it
has possessed the lands claimed for a period of time sufficient to establish a stable relationship with them, and to defeat the claims of previous
native occupants. Possession from "time immemorial" need not be shown.
(4) The lands must form part of the Indian Territories .
The final requirement for the acquisition of aboriginal title is that
the lands claimed must form part of the Indian Territories . Lands previously removed from the Territories and converted to General Lands
are no longer freely available for appropriation by native groups .
We will consider in the next section the ways in which lands in the
Indian Territories may lawfully be transformed into General Lands . Here
it is sufficient to note that where a group asserts aboriginal title to lands
currently in their possession, it will be presumed in law that the lands
still form part of the Indian Territories, in the absence of proof to the
contrary . It is for the party submitting that the lands have been converted to General Lands to establish that fact . 131 Otherwise the group
claiming aboriginal title would be put to the task of proving a negative,
namely that at no previous time had the lands been withdrawn from the
Indian Territories . The same presumption operates where the claimant
group is not currently in possession of the lands but can show that it
held them at some time in the past, in which case the presumption applies
to the period when the group was last in possession .
B . Removal of Land from the Indian Territories and Extinguishment of
Aboriginal Title
As we have seen, the Indian Territories, are lands under Crown
sovereignty that are open to native use and occupation . However, not
tso In Simon v. The Queen, supra, footnote 15, at pp . 407-408 (S .C .R .), 407
(D .L .R .), the Supreme Court of Canada, in the course of holding that relatively slim
evidence was sufficient to prove that an Indian was a descendant of Micmac Indians
who signed a treaty with the Crown in 1752, stated: "It must . . . be sufficient, for
otherwise no Micmac Indian would be able to establish descendancy. The Micmacs did
not keep written records. Micmac traditions are largely oral in nature . To impose an
impossible burden of proof would, in effect, render nugatory any right to hunt that a
present-day Shubenacadie Micmac Indian would otherwise be entitled to invoke based
on this Treaty ."
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every part of the Indian Territories is necessarily subject to aboriginal
land rights at a given time. Areas that have not been occupied or used
by native peoples for a considerable period are free of aboriginal title for
the time.-being. 132 But as long as they are part of the Indian Territories
they remain available for native occupation in the future . In principle,
then, one can distinguish between the Indian Territories proper and the
areas within the Territories that are subject to aboriginal title.
This distinction gives rise to two separate but related questions.
First, in what ways may lands in the Indian Territories be converted to
General Lands, and thus made available for settlement? Second, in what
ways may aboriginal title be extinguished? The questions are closely
linked in practice, because the conversion of lands in the Indian Territories
to General Lands usually involves the extinguishment of aboriginal title,
and the extinguishment of aboriginal title often converts the lands in
question to General Lands. However, in neither instance is this always
true. Thus, where the lands withdrawn from the Indian Territories are
vacant at the time, the withdrawal does not extinguish the aboriginal
title of any group. Again, where a native group abandons lands in the
Indian Territories, their aboriginal title to the lands will lapse after a
period, but the lands will remain in the Indian Territories .
We will deal first with the ways of withdrawing lands from the
Indian Territories, covering both vacant and occupied lands. In doing
this, we will also consider most of the methods for extinguishing aborig
inal title. We will then briefly consider methods of extinguishment that
do not involve a withdrawal from the Indian Territories.
(1) Removal of Lands from the Indian Territories
What lands make up the Indian Territories? The simple answer,
which requires elaboration, is as follows. Under the doctrine of aboriginal land rights, all North American lands claimed by the Crown pre
sumptively form part of the Indian Territories; the presumption is defeated
by proof of a lawful act converting portions of the Indian Territories into
General Lands or Indian Reserves . The Indian Territories, then, are a
residual category : they comprise what remains after lands converted to
I n Simon v. The Queen, ibid ., it was argued that the Crown had extinguished
native rights to all territories in Nova Scotia outside of Indian reserves, and in so doing
had extinguished a treaty right to hunt over such lands. The court held, at pp . 405-407
(S .C.R.), 405-406 (D.L.R.), that strict proof of the fact of extinguishment is required in
each case, remarking: "It is impossible for this Court to consider the doctrine of extinguishment `in the air' ; the respondent must anchor that argument in the bedrock of
specific lands." In the Calder case, supra, footnote 10, at pp . 404 (S .C .R .), 210 D.L .R .),
Hall J. stated that the onus of proving extinguishment of Indian title lies on the party
alleging extinguishment .
132 As will be argued below, the failure to occupy or use lands did not bring about
the immediate cessation of aboriginal title; a certain period of time was necessary.
131

19871

Understanding Aboriginal Rights

763

General Lands and Indian Reserves are subtracted . Here we are concerned only with the transformation of Indian Territories into General
Lands. The creation of Indian Reserves will be discussed later. 133
Under the doctrine of aboriginal title, the prime method for converting Indian Territories into General Lands is cession from the native
occupants to the Crown. Arguments of varying strength can also be
made for additional methods: Crown occupation, statutory taking ; act of
state, Crown grant, adverse possession, and act of the French Crown.
We will examine each of these as a matter of Canadian common law,
while also giving some attention to the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and
the Constitution Acts of 1867 and 1982 .
(a) Cession
A native group may cede or sell lands in its possession to the Crown,
thus extinguishing its rights in accordance with the terms of the agreement . Any lands ceded outright cease to belong to the Indian Territories
and enter the general land system of the jurisdiction . For a treaty to
extinguish aboriginal title, it must be concluded voluntarily by the group
holding title to the land, with knowledge of the significance of the
transaction .
From the early stages of English settlement, private individuals often
purchased lands from the Indians and claimed to have obtained a title
that was valid within the general land system of the colony . Such trans
actions were repeatedly forbidden by legislation passed in most of the
English colonies, and were generally outlawed by royal decree in the
Royal Proclamation of 1763 . 131 Official practice coupled with strong
policy considerations gave rise to a common law rule that aboriginal
title cannot be transferred to private persons but only to the Crown. "'
As noted earlier, this rule seemingly did not affect the capacity of native
peoples to deal in lands among themselves, assuming that native custom
permitted transactions of this kind . 136
The Federal Crown has the exclusive power to negotiate land cession agreements with Indians under section 91(24) of the Constitution
Act, 1867 . 13 Indian lands that are surrendered to the Federal Crown
pass into the general land system of the Province in which they are
133

See below, the text at footnotes 165-171 .
See Slattery, op . cit., footnote 19, pp . 112-117, 310-312.
135
Johnson and Graham's Lessee v. McIntosh, supra, footnote 36 ; Calder v. AttorneyGeneral ofBritish Columbia, supra, footnote 10, per Judson J., at pp . 320-321 (S .C .R .),
151 D.L.R.), per Hall J., at pp. 381-385 (S .C .R .), 194-196 (D .L .R .) . See text above at
footnotes 52-54 .
136 See
text above, at footnote 54 .
137 .Supra, footnote 43 . See the discussion below
at footnotes 174-176, 188-221 .
134
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located and, in the absence of special agreements, are at the disposal of
the Provincial Crown. 138 It seems likely that the federal power to negotiate land cessions has not ended with the entrenchment of "existing aboriginal and treaty rights" in section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 . 139
The section protects unextinguished aboriginal land rights from future
statutory abridgment, but it does not prohibit voluntary cessions to the
Crown . Nevertheless, the section arguably imports strict constitutional
standards safeguarding the interests of the native groups concerned and
ensuring the essential fairness of a cession. 140
Crown occupation
It is submitted that the Crown or persons acting under its authority
may take possession of lands within the Indian Territories that are not at
that time subject to the aboriginal rights of any native group. 141 These
lands enter the general land system of the relevant jurisdiction and henceforth are not available for native appropriation under aboriginal title. For
this mode to operate, the lands in question must be free of existing
aboriginal rights . The fact that lands are temporarily unoccupied does
not necessarily mean that they are legally vacant, because, as will be
seen below, a certain period of time must pass before a native group
loses title to lands that it has ceased to occupy .
It could be argued, to the contrary, that lands in the Indian Territories
cannot be converted to General Lands by occupation, because this method
allows the Crown to reduce unilaterally the stock of lands available for
aboriginal occupation without the consent of the native peoples indirectly affected. This argument suggests, in effect, that the Indian Territories
are the patrimony of native peoples generally, and cannot be appropriated by the Crown without native consent, in the absence of" valid legislation . The argument, however, is not persuasive . Were it true, Indian
Territories that were not burdened by aboriginal title could not readily
be converted to General Lands because there would be no identifiable
native group capable of ceding them . Thus, such lands would actually
be more difficult for the Crown to obtain for settlement than lands subject to aboriginal title, where the title-holders could be identified .
(b)

138

St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber Co . v . The Queen, supra, footnote 52 .

139 Supra, footnote 1 .

lao The argument is made in Slattery ,OC
I .,
.,f^-tote 91 at pp . 256-257 ; B .
,"
Slattery, The Hidden Constitution : Aboriginal Rights in Canada (1984), 32 Amer. J . of
Comp . Law 361, at p . 387 .
141 A
s seen earlier, the Crown cannot, by virtue of the prerogative, lawfully take
possession of lands burdened by aboriginal title ; see text, supra, at footnotes 70-79 .
Moreover, private individuals cannot gain title to vacant lands in the Indian Territories
by occupation, in the absence of authority from the Crown in a grant ; see discussion
below at footnotes 158-159 .
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It seems probable, then, that occupation is a valid method of
transferring lands from the Indian Territories, and that the settlement of
certain parts of Canada, such as portions of the St. Lawrence Valley,
can be justified on this basis . It should be noted, however, that the
amount of land available for unilateral occupation by the Crown was
always relatively small.
The Crown or its deputies must perform definite acts of possession
in order to remove vacant lands from the Indian Territories by occupation. A Crown grant coupled with possessory acts by the grantee would
be sufficient, but it is submitted that a grant standing alone would not."'
Unless the grantee takes possession, the land arguably remains available
for aboriginal occupation. This observation, however, does not apply to
lands withdrawn from the Indian Territories by other methods, such as
cession. It is submitted that these lands are permanently removed from
the pool of lands available for aboriginal occupation, regardless of whether
or not they are granted out by the Crown or are actually in anyone's
possession . Otherwise the Crown might have to secure the cession of
lands several times over, and grants of ceded lands would often be affected
by uncertainty over the lands' status .
Occupation as a mode of withdrawing lands from the Indian Territories
may have virtually ceased to operate in the provinces at Confederation,
due to the division of powers effected in the Constitution Act, 1867 . 143
The provincial Crown has the general power to grant lands within provincial boundaries, but its capacity to withdraw unoccupied lands from
the Indian Territories is seemingly limited by section 91(24) of the Act,
which gives the federal government jurisdiction over "Indians and Lands
reserved for the Indians" . 44 The federal Crown, on the other hand,
arguably has general legislative and administrative authority over aboriginal lands under that section, but lacks the power to grant such lands to
others . '45 The result may be that neither Crown can withdraw vacant
land from the Indian Territories simply by means of a grant.
(c) Statutory taking
Aboriginal title, like other property rights, can in principle be statutorily
expropriated, subject to any constitutional limitations. The statute must
express a clear intention to terminate Indian title, whether by specific
words or necessary implication, and ambiguous phraseology will be inter"

Certainly, the original Royal Charters granting North American lands to various
groups and individuals were not in practice taken to convert Indian Territories into lands
unavailable for native appropriation ; see discussion in Slattery, op . cit., footnote 19, pp .
95-125 .
143 Supra, footnote 43 .
144
See infra, at footnotes 174-176, 188-221 .
14s
St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber Co . v . The Queen, supra, footnote 52 .
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preted in favour of the Indians. tab The taking of native lands presumptively gives rise to a duty to pay fair compensation . 147 Generally speaking, the Crown cannot expropriate aboriginal lands by prerogative act;
legislation is required."'
As we will see later, it can be argued that the Royal Proclamation
of 1763'49 imposed strict constitutional limitations on the power of local
Canadian legislatures to expropriate aboriginal land rights . These restric
tions remained in place until the passage of the Constitution Act, 1867,' 50
or possibly until the Statute of Westminster, 1931 .'5 ' In any case, by
virtue of section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, the Federal Parliament alone is competent to extinguish aboriginal title. 152 Since the
enactment of section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982,' 53 the federal
power to expropriate aboriginal lands is defunct, except perhaps in cases
of necessity .
(d) Act of state
In the early days of colonization, the Crown sometimes conquered
aboriginal territories in the course of war. In British law, the property
rights of a conquered people are presumed to continue undisturbed, in
the absence of some definite act of expropriation by the Crown performed in the course of acquisition."' On the occasions when the Crown
actually conquered a native American group, it seems normally to have
146
In Calder, supra, footnote 10, at pp . 401-404 (S .C .R.), 208-210 (D .L .R .),
Hall J. at one point states that legislation must be "specific", and later that the intention
to extinguish must be "clear and plain" . In the Baker Lake case, supra, footnote 16, at
pp . 566-569, Mahoney J. holds that a clear intention may be inferred from the necessary
effects of legislation. As for the origins of the requirement, LaForest J.A . comments in
Paul v. Canadian Pacific Limited, supra, footnote 91, at p. 33 : "This appears to be a
special application of the general presumption that the Legislature does not, in the absence
of clear words, intend to interfere with vested rights . . ." The rule that statutes relating
to Indians should be liberally construed in their favour was laid down by the Supreme
Court of Canada in Nowegijick v. The Queen, [19831 I S .C .R . 29, at p. 36, (1983), 144
D.L .R. (3d) 193, at p. 198.
147
See text, supra, at footnotes 90-104 .
148
See text, supra, at footnotes 70-79.
149
Supra, footnote 3.
150
Supra, footnote 43 .
151
22 Geo. V, c.4 (U .K .) . See discussion below at footnotes 183-1,87 .
152
See discussion below at footnotes 174-176, 188-221 .
153
Supra, footnote 1 . See discussion in Slattery, loc. cit., footnote 91, and Slattery,
loc. cit., footnote 140.
154
Guerin v. The Queen, supra, footnote 4, per Dickson J., at pp . 378 (S .C .R .),
336 (D .L .R .) ; Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia, supra, faotnote 10, per
Hall J., at pp . 402-403 (S .C .R .) . 208-209 (D .L .R .) ; Amodu Tijani v. Secretary, South
ern Nigeria, supra, footnote 52 ; Oyekan v. Adele, [19571 2 All E.R . 785 (P .C .) . See
discussion and references in Slattery, op . cit., footnote 19, pp . 45-62.
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left them in the.possession of their lands . However, at times, lands may
have been seized as an act of state and placed at the disposal of the
colony .
®f course, conquest ceased to operate as a possible mode of acquiring aboriginal lands once the Crown gained sovereignty over the native
peoples in question . As subjects of the Crown, such peoples would hence
forth be entitled to its protection . Their lands could not be seized by
executive act, without authorizing legislation. 155
(e)

Crown grant

At common law, a Crown grant of land burdened by aboriginal title
will not extinguish it, but will take effect subject to the title or else be
void . 156 This rule applies to the Federal and Provincial Crowns, and also
to the Imperial Crown and local colonial governments before Confederation .
A Crown grant authorized by legislation is in a different position .
Its effect on existing aboriginal rights is determined by a number of
factors, including the constitutional powers, of the legislature in ques
tion, the wording of the legislation, and the terms of the grant. But there
is a strong presumption against the extinguishment of aboriginal title
without native consent, which is displaced only by clear words or necessary intendment . 157
(f) Adverse possession
It might be thought that lands subject to aboriginal title could be
acquired by adverse possession, in situations where private individuals
have occupied such lands for long periods of time . Put, as seen earlier,
the land systems introduced into the American colonies were founded on
the principle that settlers could gain title to land only by grant from the
Crown. Title to ungranted land could not be obtained at common law
either by settling on it or buying it from the Indians, and the Proclamation of 1763 158. reflects the common law on this point.
The rule may have harsh consequences in particular cases . Take the
position of a private individual who himself and through his predecessors has been in possession of aboriginal lands continuously for over a
century. Let us suppose his possession is not tainted by fraud, secrecy,
permission, or force, and that throughout this period the original native
15s
The technical reason is that there can be no act of state between the Crown and
its subjects on British territory; see Slattery, ibid ., pp . 46-48 . .
156
See text, supra, at footnotes 70-79.
157
See text, supra, at footnote 146.
158 Supra, footnote 3. See text above at footnotes 52-54. The question whether title
to Indian lands may be gained by adverse possession under statutory provisions governing the limitation of actions is a distinct matter .
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possessors were capable in law and fact of taking action to eject the
squatters but failed, until now, to do so. It can be argued that in such
circumstances the adverse possessor must surely be capable at common
law of defeating the claim of the aboriginal group . Whatever the force
of this argument, it is hard to see how it can be accepted without
undermining the premises upon which the land systems of the colonies
were constructed .
If, however, one accepts the view that private individuals may acquire
title to aboriginal lands by long periods of adverse possession, aboriginal peoples dispossessed in this manner arguably would be entitled to
receive monetary compensation for their loss where the dispossession
took place with the support of a governmental authority. Take, for example, a situation where a settler took possession of native lands under a
Crown grant that in law did not extinguish the aboriginal title of the
native occupants, who nevertheless were sufficiently intimidated to move
off the land. In such a case, the government involved or its successor
would have the legal duty to compensate the native people, on the argument that a defacto expropriation of this kind is governed by the same
presumption requiring compensation as a statutory expropriation. '59
(g) Act of the French Crown
It could be argued that territories acquired by the British Crown by
cession or conquest from France did not form part of the Indian Territories
and, with a few exceptions, were not burdened with aboriginal title or
any other form of native land rights . This argument _maintains that the
French Crown never generally recognized the existence of native land
rights in the territories it claimed, or alternately that it extinguished such
rights in the process of colonization . The only exceptions, on this view,
were a few small tracts of land specifically set aside by French authorities for Indian use.' 60
Two sorts of responses may be made to such arguments . First, it
can be argued that the French did not in fact claim full title to lands
occupied by Indian nations within the asserted boundaries of New France . '6'
Such a claim would have been imprudent, because the security and welfare of the French colony depended on good relations with the native
peoples. In any case, the number of French settlers was small, and little
159

See text, supra, at footnotes 90-104 .
See, for example, H . Brun, Les droits des Indiens sur le territoire du Québec
(1969), 10 C. de D. 415, pp . 428-430.
161
For detailed analysis of the relevant documents, see: Slattery, ov . cit., footnote
19, pp . 70-94; B. Slattery, Did France Claim Canada upon Discovery?, in J.M . Bumsted
(ed.), Interpreting Canada's Past (1986), Vol . I, pp . 2-26, originally published in (1978),
59 Can. Hist . Rev . 139. Se e also W.J . Eccles, Sovereignty-Association, 1500-1783
(1984), 65 Can. Hist. Rev. 475.
16°
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land was needed to accommodate them. Much of the land settled by the
French in the St. Lawrence Valley seems to have been unoccupied at the
time of settlement .
Second, it can be argued that in areas that the British crown acquired
by conquest or cession from France, the doctrine of aboriginal rights
applied as fully as it did in areas that Britain claimed as a matter of
original right. The status of lands in a conquered or ceded territory such
as Acadia or Canada is governed by colonial law, which incorporates
the doctrine of aboriginal rights . t 62 Under British colonial law, the lands
gained from France presumptively belonged to the Indian Territories, in
the absence of some act converting them to General Lands .
Regardless of the position at common law, the salient provisions of
the Royal Proclamation of 1763'63 applied to the lands acquired from the
French Crown, both in Acadia and Canada, and these provisions consti
tute an official recognition by the British Crown of the existence of
subsisting aboriginal land rights to unceded Indian lands within the territories
formerly claimed by France . 16'
(2) Loss of Aboriginal Title Within The Indian Territories
We have seen that the Indian Territories make up an area where
aboriginal title is gained by appropriation and maintained by possession .
It follows that aboriginal title may be lost when a native group voluntar
ily leaves its lands and moves elsewhere. However, in such a case, the
group's title will lapse only after a sufficient time has passed to indicate
that the group has irrevocably cut its links with the lands, and taken up
permanent residence elsewhere. How long a time this takes depends on
the circumstances. It seems unlikely that a native group would lose title
to its former lands more rapidly than it could acquire title to its new
lands .
When aboriginal title to lands in the Indian Territories is extinguished by abandonment, the lands revert to the common pool of lands
available for native use, and may be appropriated in future by other
native groups . In other words, the lands do not become General Lands,
but remain part of the Indian Territories .
IV. Aboriginal Lands and Indian Reserves
As we have seen, at an early stage of colonial settlement, the categories
of Indian Territories and General Lands were supplemented by a third:
See text, supra, at footnotes 31-33.
Supra, footnote 3.
164
See Adams v . R., [1985] 4 C.N.L.R. 39 (Que. S.C.), [1985] 4 C.N.L.R. 123
(Que . C.S.P.), and detailed discussion in Slattery, op. cit., footnote 19, esp. pp. 165-174,
217-227, 244-247, 261-267. Cf. Brun, loc. cit., footnote 160, at pp. 440-450. For
analysis of the Proclamation of 1763, see text, infra, at footnotes 172-173, 183-187.
162
163
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"Indian Reserves" ."' An Indian Reserve is land that has become permanently attached to a particular group of native people under a legal
regime similar to that of aboriginal title . Unlike lands in the Indian
Territories, a Reserve cannot be lost by non-occupation or gained by
another group simply by appropriation. On the other hand, a Reserve is
not governed by the land regime applying to General Lands but by a
special body of rules .
Indian Reserves can be classified along various lines. For our purposes, there are two types. In the first type of reserve, the group's title
can be traced back to its title to aboriginal lands in the Indian Territories.
Title to such a Reserve is thus a derivative form of aboriginal title . In
the second type of Reserve, the group's title stems from a statutory
provision, Crown Grant, or other similar instrument, and not from aboriginal title at common law . We will call the first type, "Aboriginal Reserves",
and the second, "Granted Reserves" .
A. Aboriginal Reserves

Reserves of this type are remarkably diverse, and are often overlaid
with so thick a veneer of history that they are not immediately recognizable . Some comprise small pockets of land that were retained by a native
group when they ceded the rest their aboriginal territories to the Crown. 166
So long as the lands were not included in the cession (as distinct from
lands that were surrendered to the Crown and then granted back to the
Indians as Reserves), the group's title to them will continue to rest on
the common law, although the treaty may, of course, confirm it. Reserves
carved by unilateral governmental act out of a group's unsurrendered
ancestral lands are in the same position, unless the constituent act extinguishes the group's aboriginal title."' It seems arguable that Reserves
may also emerge by more gradual and informal processes, as when aboriginal lands occupied by a particular group come to be surrounded by General Lands, and acquire definite boundaries and strong historical ties
with the group in question."'
165
See text above at footnote 55 . For a survey, see R.H . Bartlett, Reserve Lands,
in Morse, op. cit., footnote 6, pp . 467-578 .
166 See, for example, the Robinson Huron Treaty
of 1850, where the Indians cede
to the Crown their rights to a designated territory "save and except the reservations set
forth in the schedule hereunto annexed" ; Morris, op . cit., footnote 27, p. 305 .
167
Thus, in the Guerin case, supra, footnote 4, Dickson J., after stating that the
Indian interest in a reserve was the same as in traditional tribal lands, went on to remark,
at pp . 379 (S .C .R.), 337 (D .L.R .) : "It is worth noting . . . that the reserve in question
here was created out of the ancient tribal territory of the Musqueam Band by the unilateral action of the Colony of British Columbia, prior to Confederation ."
168 A
n example may be the St. Regis Reserve, the history of which is discussed in
R. v. Adams, supra, footnote 164.
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. Granted Reserves
Other Reserves are held by virtue of a Crown act or statute, and not
under the common law doctrine of aboriginal title . Some, for example,
owe their origins to grants to Indian nations dislocated as the result of
war, as with the lands set aside after the American Revolution for Iroquois
Loyalists in southern Ontario, `9 and the lands granted to the Hurons in
Quebec during the French regime . "° Other Reserves were created by the
Crown out of lands ceded to it by Indian treaty . These differ (at least
notionally) from tracts excepted from a surrender since the Indians' right
to such a tract arguably depends on the treaty or other act creating the
reserve, rather than the common law .
The fact that Granted Reserves owe their existence to particular
provisions that differ in wording and status clearly allows for the possibility that such Reserves lack a uniform legal character. Nevertheless,
we are bound to take account of an authoritative and long-standing judicial holding, reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Guerin, that title to
Indian Reserves of all sorts is identical to aboriginal title. 171 On this
view, there is no significant legal difference between Aboriginal Reserves
and Granted Reserves, or between Reserve title and aboriginal title.
This holding is obviously apt as regards Aboriginal Reserves, since
title to these Reserves originates in aboriginal title. But it is less clearly
applicable to Granted Reserves . While it is arguable that the Crown
under the prerogative cannot create reserves that depart substantially from
the aboriginal model, it seems unlikely that a legislature would be incapable of doing so . The judicial holding is perhaps best understood, then,
as laying down a presumption of uniformity . On this view, title to Granted
Reserves is presumptively the same as title to Aboriginal Reserves and
aboriginal title generally, in the absence of wording in the governing act
that signals a clear departure from the normal model .
It is submitted, however, that in one respect Reserve title presumptively differs from aboriginal title in its pure form . Whereas in the Indian
Territories aboriginal title is founded on appropriation and maintained
by possession, title to a Reserve is permanently vested in a particular
group, and cannot be lost simply by non-occupation or gained by another
group by appropriation .
169 See the account in R.J. Surtees, Indian Land Surrenders in Ontario, 1763-1867
(Research Branch, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 1984), pp . 19-26.
17° See the account of the foundation of the reserve at Lorette in G.F .G . Stanley,
The First Indian `Reserves' in Canada (1950), 4 Rev. d'Histoire de l'Am6rique Française
178, at pp . 191-195. For discussion of the legal status of Quebec reserves, see R.H .
Bartlett, Indian Reserves in Quebec (U . of Sask . Native Law Centre : 1984) .
"1 Per Dickson J., supra, footnote 4, at pp . 379 (S .C .R .), 336-337 (D .L .R .),
reaffirming the holding in Attorney-General for Quebec v. Attorney-General for Canada, supra, footnote 82 . The holding has attracted its share of criticism. For a recent

772

LA REVUE DU BARRE CANADIEN

[Vol . 66

C. Statuton Classifications of Native Lands

It remains to explain how this common law classification of native
lands relates to such statutory schemes as the Royal Proclamation of
1763, the Constitution Act, 1867, and the federal Indian Acts .
The Royal Proclamation of 1763 refers to several overlapping categories of native lands. I'2 The first is described in the preamble to the
Indian Part, where the King affirms that the Indian nations who live
under British protection "should not be molested or disturbed in the
Possession of such Parts of Our Dominions and Territories as, not having been ceded to, or purchased by Us, are reserved to them, or any of
them, as their Hunting Grounds" . This passage treats as reserved for
Indians all those parts of the Crown's dominions in America that the
Indians have not ceded or sold to the Crown. The description is broad
enough to cover both the Indian Territories and Aboriginal Reserves .
However, strictly interpreted, it might not include certain Granted Reserves:
those created out of Indian lands that had already been ceded to the
Crown.
Later, the Proclamation refers to a broader category of Indian lands .
It states that no private person shall make any purchases "of any Lands
reserved to the said Indians", and provides that such lands can only be
purchased by the colonial governments. This provision refers to any
lands whatever that are reserved to the Indians, and so covers not only
the Indian Territories and Aboriginal Reserves, but also Granted Reserves .
The third category described in the Proclamation is what may be
called "the Indian Country" . This category has attracted a lot of academic and judicial attention, apparently on the assumption that it is still
relevant today. In fact, the category was overtaken by historical events
in the decade following the Proclamation's appearance and has less legal
interest than the two categories considered above. The Proclamation creates a temporary pool of lands lying west of the main settled areas that
is closed to settlement and official purchases for the time being. The
Country is defined negatively as all British Territories lying west of the
Appalachian Mountains that are not included within the colonial boundaries of Quebec, East and West Florida, and Rupert's Land (the territories
granted to the Hudson's Bay Company) . The intention was to prevent
any purchases of Indian lands from taking place in this area for the time
being (even purchases by colonial governments), and thus to halt the
spread of white settlement into the American interior . But the Proclamation's wording makes it clear that the provision was a temporary expedient, and in fact the eastern boundaries of the Indian Country were redeexample, see H. Brun, La possession et la réglementation des droits mimers, forestiers
et de réversion dans les réserves indiennes du Québec (1985), 30 McGill L.J . 415 .
172 Supra, footnote 3. For detailed discussion, see Slattery, op . cit., footnote 19,
pp . 191-282.
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fmed and substantially altered in a series of treaties negotiated with various
Indian nations over the next decade, with the Crown's approval . 173
The Indian Country is a creature of the Proclamation, and does not
reflect the common law categories considered above. The Country clearly
does not include all the lands in the Indian Territories . Large parts of
Quebec and Rupert's Land, for example, were still part of the Indian
Territories, yet they are excluded from the Country as defined. Nor does
it include most of the Aboriginal and Granted Reserves existing at that
period . For most purposes, the Indian Country is of little interest today.
The continuing relevance of the Proclamation of 1763 lies in the general
provisions dealing with Indian lands, which in essence closely follow
the tenets of the common law doctrine of aboriginal title.
Section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 174 gives the federal
Parliament exclusive jurisdiction over "Indians and Lands reserved for
the Indians" . The phrase likely covers all lands reserved for aboriginal
peoples, whether Indian, Inuit, or Metis . 17' The important question is
how broadly the term "reserved" should be interpreted .
In the ,fit. Catherine's case, 176 the Privy Council considered the
argument that section 91(24) does not cover land occupied by virtue of
the Proclamation of 1763, but only tracts set aside for Indians after the
Proclamation was issued . The Committee rejected this argument, observing that the words used in the section "are, according to their natural
meaning, sufficient to include all lands reserved, upon any terms or
conditions, for Indian occupation". They continued: "It appears to be
the plain policy of the Act that, in order to ensure uniformity of administration, all such lands, and Indian affairs generally, shall be under the
legislative control of one central authority . "177 These observations strongly
suggest that section 91(24) covers native lands generally, both those in
the Indian Territories as well as Aboriginal and Granted Reserves . This
conclusion follows directly from the holding that Proclamation lands are
within the section's scope, for, as we have just seen, all forms of native
lands are covered by one or other of the Proclamation's provisions .
Greater uncertainty surrounds another statutory class of native lands.
In the various Indian Acts passed since Confederation, Parliament has
173 See, for
example, L. Ire Vorsey, The Indian Boundary in the Southern Colonies, 1763-1775 (1966) .
174
Supra, footnote 43 .
175
The term "Indians" has been held to include the Inuit or Eskimo peoples, and
it probably also covers some people of mixed blood, such as the Metis. See: Re Term
"Indians", [1939] S.C .R . 104; C. Chartier, `Indian' : An Analysis of the Term as Used
in Section 91(24) of the British North America Act, 1867 (1978-79), 43 Sask . L. Rev.
37 ; P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (2nd ed ., 1985), pp . 552-553.
176
Supra, footnote 52 .
177
Ibid., at p. 59 .
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singled out for special treatment a category of lands usually described as
"reserves" . 178 The term is defined in slightly different ways in the various Acts . The current Act states that "reserve" means "a tract of land,
the legal title to which is vested in Her Majesty, that has been set apart
by Her Majesty for the use and benefit of a band" .179 If this definition is
read in the light of the Proclamation of 1763 and the Privy Council's
remarks in St. Catherine's, it arguably extends not just to granted lands
but to aboriginal lands generally. The common assumption, however, is
that a narrower class of lands is designated, although how that class
should be identified is problematical . There is every reason to think that
the definition is not confined to granted lands and that at least certain
types of lands held under aboriginal title are covered, notably what we
have called Aboriginal Reserves . "' Whether coverage extends beyond
such Reserves to aboriginal lands generally is an open question .
V. Legislative Authority over Aboriginal Rights
Aboriginal rights have clearly been affected over the years by legislation,"
but the extent of the inroads is uncertain . The matter is complicated by
the provisions of several important constitutional documents, including
the Royal Proclamation of 1763, the Constitution Act, 1867, and the
Constitution Act, 1982, which shield aboriginal rights from legislative
intrusion. 182
It can be argued, for instance, that the Indian provisions of the
Royal - Proclamation of 1763 1$3 could not be repealed by Canadian legislatures prior to 1931, but only by the Imperial Parliament . This proposi
tion rests on judicial holdings that the Proclamation was an act of the
Imperial Crown equivalent in force and effect to an Act of Parliament . "a
17 $ See generally R.H . Bartlett, The Indian Act of Canada (University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1980); first published in (1977-78), 27 Buf. Law Rev. 581 .
179 Indian
Act, supra, footnote 112, s. 2(l) .
is° In R . v. Lady McMaster, [19261 Ex . C .R . 68, the court proceeded on the basis
that the Indian lands in question were Proclamation lands (at pp . 69, 73), and also held,
at p. 75, that the lands were covered by certain provisions of the Indian Act. See also:
R . v . Easterbrook, [19291 Ex . C.R . 28, aff'd. [19311 S.C .R . 210; St . Catharines Milling and Lumber Co . v. The Queen, supra, footnote 52, at pp . 636-637, per Strong J.
1$ ' See text, supra, at footnotes 45-47.
1$= These are the most general of the relevant instruments . But some parts of Canada are governed by particular constitutional instruments of equal importance . See, for
example, the excellent discussion of the constitutional terms governing the transfer of
Rupert's Land and the North-Western Territory to Canada, in K. McNeil, Native Claims
in Rupert's Land and the North-Western Territory: Canada's Constitutional Obligations
(U . of Sask . Native Law Centre : 1982). See, generally, Cumming and Mickenberg, op .
cit., footnote 8.
iss Supra, footnote 3 .
1$4 R. v. Lady McMaster, supra. footnote 180, at pp . 72-73; Easterbrook v. R.,
[19311 S.C .R . 210, at pp . 214-215, 217-218, affirming [19291 Ex . C.R . 28, at pp .
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As such, it arguably had the effect of an Imperial statute and was paramount to local statutes under the Colonial Laws Yalidity Act, 1865 . 185 If
this is correct, pre-Confederation colonial legislation must be read subject to the Proclamation's terms. The same may hold . true of statutes
passed by the Canadian Parliament and provincial legislatures prior to
the Statute of Westminster, 186 which in 1931 released Canada from any
imperial bonds other than those embodied in the Constitution Acts . 187
A second issue relates to the distribution of powers between federal
and provincial legislatures under the Constitution Act, 1867,188 section
91(24) of which gives the Canadian Parliament exclusive authority over
"Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians" . Aboriginal rights are
intimately connected with the special status and capacities of Indian peoples and the possession and use of their lands . 189 It seems probable,
then, that they form an intrinsic part of the subject-matters covered by
section 91(24) . ®n this view, the federal Parliament has the exclusive
power to deal with aboriginal rights, and, subject to the possible constitutional limitations mentioned above, it may exercise that power so as to
regulate or extinguish the rights in question ."
Under general constitutional principles, the provinces cannot legislate in relation to subject-matters falling within exclusive federal juris-

29-30; R. v. White and Bob (1964), 50 D.L.R . (2d) 613 (B .C .C .A .), per Norris J.A., at
pp . 636, 644; R. v. Isaac, supra, footnote 71, per MacKeigan C.J ., at p. 478, per
Cooper J.A ., at p. 496; Calder v. Attorney General of British Columbia, supra, footnote 10, per Hall J., at pp . 394-395 (S .C .R .), 203 (D .L .R .) . The Proclamation's validity and legal effects are considered in Slattery, op . cit., footnote 19, pp . 283-313.
185 R . v. White and Bob, ibid ., per Norris J.A ., at p. 662; R. v. Isaac, supra,
footnote 71, per MacKeigan C.J ., at p . 485; R. v. Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs, [1982] 2 All E.R . 118 (C .A .), per Lord Denning M.R ., at pp.
124, 125. The arguments pro and con are discussed in Slattery, op . cit., footnote 19,
pp . 315-319.
186
Supra, footnote 151 .
187 See Hogg, op . cit., footnote 175, pp . 40-42; Slattery, loc. cit., footnote 31, at
pp . 393-396.
188
Supra, footnote 43 . See generally, Lysyk, loc. cit., footnote 57 ; K.M . Lysyk,
Constitutional Developments Relating to Indians and Indian Lands : An Overview, in
Law Society of Upper Canada Special Lectures, The Constitution and. the Future of
Canada (1978), pp . 201-228; Hogg, op . cit., footnote 175, pp . 551-562; K. McNeil,
Indian Hunting, Trapping and Fishing Rights in the Prairie Provinces of Canada (University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre : 1983); N. Lyon, Constitutional Issues in
Native Law, in Morse, op . cit., footnote 6,_pp . 408-451; D. Sanders, The Application
of Provincial Laws, in Morse, ibid., pp . 452-466; P. Hughes, Indians and Lands Reserved
for the Indians: Off-Limits to the Provinces? (1983), 21 Osg. Hall Law J. 82 .
189
The requirement of a close connection with Indian status or rights is articulated
by Beetz J. in Four B Manufacturing Ltd. v. United Garment Workers of America,
[19801 1 S .C .R . 1031, at pp . 1047-1048, (1979), 102 D.L .R . (3d) 385, at p. 397.
190 R.
v. Derriksan, supra, footnote 45 ; Kruger and Manuel v. The Queen, supra,
footnote 45, at pp . 116 (S .C .R .), 443 (D .L .R .) .
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diction. Thus, provincial laws that single out Indians and Indian lands
for special treatment are invalid."' This does not mean, however, that
these subjects are immune to provincial power. Provincial laws of general application may apply to them in aspects falling within provincial
jurisdiction ."' It is clear, for example, that provincial traffic laws govern Indians driving on a public road, and that the laws of contract apply
to Indians shopping in a normal drug-store .
Nevertheless, there is a point at which provincial laws of general
application intrude into federal jurisdiction . That point is reached where
the laws affect matters that are integral to the federal heads of power. 193
Provincial laws of general application that impair the particular status,
capacities, or rights of Indians qua Indians, 194 that affect the possession
and use of Indian lands, 195 or that abrogate or qualify Indian treaty rights"'
are invalid or must be read down so as not to affect the federal matters
in question . "' Aboriginal rights lie at the core of rights held by Indians
qua Indians. In many instances, they are intimately connected with the
use of Indian lands, as with aboriginal title and hunting and fishing
rights . In other cases, they are recognized or defined in treaties with the
191 R . v. Sutherland, [1980] 2 S .C
.R . 451, at pp . 455-456, (1980), 113 D.L .R . (3d)
374, at pp . 378-379; Dick v. The Queen, supra, footnote 57, at pp . 322-323 (S .C .R .),
56-57 (D .L .R .) .
192
Cardinal v. Attorney General ofAlberta, [1974] S .C .R . 695, at p. 703, (1973),
40 D.L .R . (3d) 553, at pp . 559-560.
193
Four B Manufacturing Ltd. v. United Garment Workers, supra, footnote 189,
per Beetz J., at pp . 1047 (S .C .R .) . 396-397 (D .L .R .) .
19a
Natural Parents v. Superintendent of Child Welfare, [197612 S.C .R . 751, (1975),
60 D.L .R . (3d) 148, per Laskin C.J ., at pp . 760-763 (S .C .R .), 154-156 (D .L.R .), per
Martiand J., at pp . 775 (S .C .R .), 165-166 (D .L .R .), per Ritchie J., at pp . 777 (S .C .R .),
167 (D .L .R .) ; Four B Manufacturing Ltd . v. United Garment Workers, supra, footnote
191, per Beetz J ., at pp . 1047-1048 (S .C .R .), 397 (D .L.R .) ; Dick v. The Queen, supra,
footnote 57, at pp . 315-321, 325-326 (S .C .R .), 51-55, 59 (D .L .R .) .
195
The leading case is Derrickson v . Derrickson, [1986] 1 S.C .R . 285, at pp .
295-296, (1986), 26 D.L .R . (4th) 175, at pp . 183-184. For earlier authorities, see, R. v.
Jim (1915), 26 C.C .C . 236 (B .C .S .C .) ; R. v. Rodgers, [1923] 3 D.L .R . 414 (Man .
C.A .) ; Corporation of Surrey v. Peace Arch Enterprises (1970), 74 W.W .R. 380
(B .C .C .A . ); Cardinal v. Attorney General of Alberta, supra, footnote 192, per Martland .
J., at pp . 704-708 (S .C .R .), 560-563 (D .L .R .) ; Millbrook Indian Band v. Northern
Counties Residential Tenancies Board (1978), 84 D.L.R . (3d) 174 (N .S .S .C .) ; Western
Industrial Contractors Ltd. v. Sarcee Developments Ltd. (1979), 98 D.L .R . (3d) 424, at
pp . 428-429. 435-436 (Alta. A.D.), The Queen v. Smith (1980) . 113 D.L.R . (3d) 522,
at pp. 571-572 (F .C .A.) ; Re Stony Plain Indian Reserve No . 135 (1981), 130 D.L .R .
(3d) 636, at p. 654 (Alta. C.A .) .
196 R. v. White and Bob, supra,
footnote 184, per Davey J.A ., at p. 618 ; approved
in Kruger and Manuel v. The Queen, supra, footnote 45, at pp . 113 (S .C .R .), 440
(D .L .R .), and Simon v. The Queen, supra, footnote 15, at pp . 441 (S .C .R .), 410 (D .L.R .) .
197 See discussion in Dick
v. The Queen, supra, footnote 57, at pp . 332 (S .C .R.),
56 (D.L .R .) .
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Crown. There is thus a strong argument for the view that aboriginal
rights cannot be impaired by provincial laws of general application . "'
The same result flows from the doctrine of federal paramountcy .' 99
This doctrine holds that, where there is a conflict between otherwise
valid federal laws and provincial laws affecting federal subject-matters
such as Indians and Indian lands, the federal laws will prevail ."' The
common law rules governing aboriginal rights are arguably federal laws
for these purposes, and the same holds true of the Royal Proclamation
of 1763 . These two points will be considered separately .
It has been held that common law rules falling within the jurisdiction of the Canadian Parliament are paramount to provincial laws . This
was the burden of the Supreme Court's ruling in Bisaillon v . Keable, 2°1
where Beetz J., speaking for the court, stated : " . . . I do not see why
the federal Parliament is under an obligation to codify legal rules if it
wishes to ensure that they have paramountcy over provincial laws, at
least when some of those legal rules fall under its exclusive jurisdiction. . ." . On this view, provincial statutes inconsistent with the common law rules governing aboriginal rights are ineffective even when
they would otherwise be valid under the constitutional division of powers ."
Pre-Confederation acts that fall within federal jurisdiction are also
federal laws for purposes of the paramountcy rule. This conclusion flows
19s
The Supreme Court has not yet decided whether provincial laws of general
application may affect aboriginal rights ex proprio vigore and apart from the effect of
section 88 of the Indian Act, considered below. The major appeals to the Supreme Court
on the application of provincial laws to Indian hunting rights have been argued and
decided apart from the question of aboriginal rights and title; see Kruger and Manuel v.
The Queen, supra, footnote 45, at pp . 108-109 (S .C .R .), 437 (D .L .R .) ; Dick v. The
Queen, supra, footnote 57, at pp . 315 (S .C .R .), 51 (D .L .R .) . In Cardinal v. Attorney
General ofAlberta, supra, footnote 192, at pp. 706-707 (S .C .R .), 562 (D .L .R .), Martland
J. expressed the opinion that a provincial game law of general application would not
relate to Indians qua Indians and so would apply to Indians hunting outside a reserve .
But the decision turned on the wording of the Alberta Natural Resources Transfer Agreement, and aboriginal hunting rights were not at issue . By contrast, in Dick v. The
Queen, ibid., pp . 320 (S .C .R .), 55 (D .L .R .), Beetz J. noted that there was considerable
evidence capable of supporting the conclusion that provincial legislation restricting hunting did in fact impair the Indianness of the Band in question there, and adopted that
assumption for the purposes of the decision .
i99
See, generally, Hogg, op . cit., footnote 175, Chap . 16 .
z°° Four B Manufacturing Ltd. v. United Garment Workers of America, supra,
footnote 189, per Beetz J., at pp . 1048-1049 (S .C .R .), 398 (D .L.R .) .
20' [198312 S.C .R . 60, at p. 108, (1983), 2 D.L .R . (4th) 193, at p. 232.
202
See discussion in R . v. Isaac, supra, footnote 71, per MacKeigan C.J ., at p.
469 . The point must be distinguished from the argument, discussed in Dick v. The
Queen, supra, footnote 57, that provincial laws of - general application that have the
effect of limiting certain aboriginal rights are invalid insofar as they affect Indians as
Indians, because they intrude into an area of exclusive federal jurisdiction . The latter
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from section 129 of the Constitution Act, 1867, 203 which provides that
laws in effect in the uniting colonies shall continue in effect after Confederation, subject to alteration or repeal by the legislature empowered
to deal with the subject-matter in question. So, where the subject-matter
of a pre-Confederation law falls under federal jurisdiction, Parliament
alone can repeal or amend it. 204 It follows that such a law is paramount
to provincial laws that are inconsistent with its terms . Otherwise a province would effectively be able to amend or repeal a pre-Confederation
law falling within federal jurisdiction . As seen above, the Canadian Parliament has the exclusive power to repeal the Indian provisions of the
Proclamation of 1763, under section 91(24) of the Constitution Act,
1867 . 20 ' Therefore, the Proclamation takes precedence over conflicting
provincial laws .
This, then, is the general scheme that results from the division of
powers under the Constitution Act, 1867 . However, the operation of the
scheme is significantly affected by section 88 of the federal Indian Act, 206
which provides :
Subject to the terms of any treaty and any other Act of the Parliament of Canada,
all laws of general application from time to time in force in any province are
applicable to and in respect of Indians in the province, except to the extent that
such laws are inconsistent with this Act or any order, rule, regulation or by-law
made thereunder, and except to the extent that such laws make provision for any
matter for which provision is made by or under this Act.

This section gives force to provincial laws of general application that
would otherwise be invalid in their application to Indians . 207 It achieves
this result by incorporating them into federal law . The laws incorporated
are subordinated to the terms of "any treaty", "any other Act of the
Parliament of Canada", and the provisions of the Indian Act and its
attendant legislation. The section does not refer to the common law
rules governing aboriginal rights . It follows that these rules can be overriden
by provincial statutes adopted as federal law.'O ' This conclusion, however, is subject to several important qualifications .
argument does not assert the existence of a federal law paramount to the provincial
statutes in question, and so differs from the point made here .
203
Supra, footnote 43 . See Hellens v. Densmore, [1957] S.C .R . 768, at p. 784
(1957), 10 D.L .R . (2d) 561, at p. 569; Re Broddy (1982), 142 D.L .R . (3d) 151 (Alta.
C.A .) ; R. v. Isaac, supra, footnote 71, per MacKeigan C.J ., at p . 468.
204
Dobie v. The Temporalities Board (1882), 7 A.C . 136 (P .C .) . For discussion
and further references, see A.H .F. Lefroy, The Law of Legislative Power in Canada
(1897-98), pp . 365-371 ; A.H .F . Lefroy, Canada's Federal System (1913), pp . 161-163.
205 See
text, supra, at footnotes 174-177.
206 Supra, footnote 112 .
207 Dick v. The Queen, supra, footnote
57 .
208
Kruger and Manuel v . The Queen, supra, footnote 45, at pp. 115-117 (S .C.R .),
442-443 (D .L .R .) .
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The first stems from the Royal Proclamation of 1763. 2°9 Section 88
refers to "any treaty and any other Act of the Parliament of Canada".
The word "other" is significant, for it indicates that the phrase "Act of
Parliament" is used in a sense broad enough to include treaties . Yet
most Indian treaties were Crown acts that were never approved or ratified by the Canadian Parliament . And it has never been thought that an
Indian treaty must be ratified by Parliament to meet the section's requirements. Second, it is clear that Indian treaties signed by the Crown before
Confederation are covered by the section, even though they obviously
cannot be viewed as "other" acts of a Parliament not yet in existence . 210
It seems possible, then, that the phrase "Act of the Parliament of Canada" does not refer exclusively to laws passed by Parliament but includes
all laws and acts in force in Canada that are subject to repeal by Parliament, including Crown acts prior to Confederation . 211 ®n this view, the
Proclamation of 1763 qualifies for the section's protection . The question
has yet to be decided by the Supreme Court . Nevertheless, lower courts
have held that the Proclamation is not a treaty or act of Parliament saved
by the section. 212
The second qualification is founded on the fact that section 88 makes
provincial laws applicable to "Indians" but does not refer to "lands
reserved forthe Indians" . Section 91(24) ofthe Constitution Act, 1867 gives
Parliament jurisdiction over both subject-matters, and the Supreme Court
has held that they are two distinct heads of power. 213 It follows that
section 88 does not referentially incorporate provincial laws that affect
the possession and use of lands reserved for Indians. 214 This interpreta209

Supra, footnote 3.
R. v. White and Bob, supra, footnote 184 (affirmed on appeal, [19561 S.C .R .
vi, (1965), 52 D.L .R . (2d) 481n); Simon v. The Queen, supra, footnote 15, at pp .
408-410 (S .C .R .), 407-409 (D .L .R .) .
21 1 The courts have given a similarly broad interpretation to the phrase "laws of
general application from time to time in force in any province", stating that it includes
not only laws passed by provincial legislatures but also any laws that form part of
provincial law, such as laws of England received into the province ; The Queen v. George,
[19661 S.C .R . 267, at pp . 280-281, (1966), 55 D.L .R. (2d) 386, at p. 398, per Martland
J. ; Natural Parents v. Superintendent of Child Welfare, supra, footnote 194, per Laskin
C.J .C ., at pp . 759 (S .C .R .), 153 (D .L .R .) ; Kruger and Manuel v'. The Queen, supra,
footnote 45, at pp . 109 (S .C .R .), 438 (D .L .R .) .
212
Kruger and Manuel v. The Queen (1975), 60 D.L .R. (3d) 144, at p. 147
(B .C .C .A .) (not considered on further appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, supra,
footnote 45); R. v. Tennisco (1981), 131 D.L .R . (3d) 96 (Ont . H.C .), reversing (1980),
[19831 1 C.N .L .R . 112 (Ont . RC .) ; R. v. Polchies (1982), 113 A.P .R . 449, at p. 454
(N .B .C .A .) .
213
Four B Manufacturing Ltd. v. United Garment Workers, supra, footnote 189,
at pp . 1040-1050 (S .C .R .), 398-399 (D .L .R .) .
214
R. v. Johns (1962), 133 C.C .C . 43, at p . 47 (Sask. C.A .); R. v. Isaac, supra,
footnote 71, per MacKeigan C.J ., at p. 474; Millbrook Indian Band v. Northern Counties Residential Tenancies Board, supra, footnote 195, at pp . 182-183; The Queen v.
210
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tion is consistent with the fiduciary responsibility of the federal Crown
to protect Indian lands . 215 It also accords with the principle that statutes
relating to Indians should be construed liberally and doubtful expressions resolved in their favour . 216
This limitation on the effect of section 88 is important for several
reasons. As noted earlier, the expression "lands reserved for the Indians" includes not only Indian reserves in the narrow sense, but also
aboriginal lands recognized by the Royal Proclamation of 1763 .2 17 Thus,
even if the Proclamation is not directly saved by the section, its provisions regarding Indian lands are protected . Second, it appears that aboriginal rights of hunting and fishing may properly be characterized as property rights, which may bring them under the shield of Indian lands . 218
These conclusions, however, have occasionally been disputed . It
has been argued that section 88 provides that all provincial laws of
general application are applicable to Indians, and it makes no difference
whether the laws are in relation to land or some other subject-matter . 219
The argument seems plausible as far as it goes . Thus, lands held by
Indians as ordinary citizens are subject to the general laws of the province, so that they must conform for example to local building and health
requirements . 220 But it does not follow that section 88 makes provincial
laws applicable to the special category of lands reserved for Indians. 221
That conclusion would follow only if such lands did not constitute a
distinct constitutional subject-matter, but were simply subsumed under
"Indians" . As it is, Parliament's power to legislate for Indian lands
does not flow from its jurisdiction over Indians . So Parliament's deciSmith, supra, footnote 195, at pp . 570-571 ; Re Stony Plain Indian Reserve No . 135,
supra, footnote 195, at pp . 653-654; Derrickson v. Derrickson (1984), 9 D .L .R . (4th)
204, at p. 208 (B .C .C .A .) ; Lysyk, loc. cit., footnote 57, at p. 518; Sanders, loc. cit.,
footnote 188, at p. 456. For a different view, see Attorney-General of Ontario v. Bear
Island Foundation, supra, footnote 16, at pp . 474-475. The Supreme Court reviewed
the issue in Derrickson v. Derrick-son, supra, footnote 195, at pp . 296-299 (S .C .R .),
185-187 (D .L .R .), but made no ruling on it .
215 See
text, supra, at footnotes 105-116.
216 Nowegijick v. The
Queen, supra, footnote 146, at pp. 36 (S .C .R .), 198 (D .L .R .) .
217 See text, supra, at footnotes 174-177 .
218
See text, supra, at footnote 57 .
219
The argument is referred to, without comment, in Derrickson v. Derrickson,
supra, footnote 195, at pp . 298-299 (S .C .R .), 186-187 (D .L .R.) .
220
Re Stony Plain Indian Reserve No . 135, supra, footnote 195, at p. 656 .
221
In Cardinal v. Attorney General of Alberta, supra, footnote 192, the Supreme
Court held that the following provision of the Alberta Natural Resources Transfer Agreement had the effect of making provincial game laws applicable to Indians even when
they were on Indian Reserves : "Canada agrees that the laws respecting game in force in
the Province from time to time shall apply to the Indians within the boundaries thereof. . ."
However, the reasoning turned on the particular wording and rationale of the clause in
question .
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sion to make provincial laws of general application applicable to Indians
leaves the subject-matter of Indian lands untouched.
Other fundamental issues are posed by section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, which recognizes and affirms the "existing aboriginal
and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada" . 222 It seems clear
that this provision entrenches the rights it refers to, so that laws that are
inconsistent with its terms are ineffective under section 52. Greater uncertainty surrounds the meaning of the word "existing" . Leaving aside
treaty rights, which pose separate problems, it appears that the word
ensures that aboriginal rights that were validly extinguished before the
Constitution Act, 1982 came into effect on 17 April 1982 are not revived
by the section. On this view, "existing" means "unextinguished" . 223

What then is the position of aboriginal rights ' that had not been
extinguished prior to 17 April 1982 but were subject at that time to laws
that regulated the way in which they could bé exercised?224 Take, for
example, an aboriginal hunting right that was governed by statutory regulations limiting the times of hunting, the species that could be hunted,
the number of animals that could be taken, and so on. Such regulations
would not extinguish the right or permanently abridge it . If they were
repealed, the right in question would resume its former shape, just as
the right of a property owner to build as he pleases on his property
revives once building restrictions are lifted . It follows that the hunting
right in question is protected by section 35(1) as an unextinguished aboriginal right. The contentious issue is how far the right is subject to the
restrictions in place on 17 April 1982 .
There are several possible solutions. The first holds that section
35(1) entrenches the right in the precise form it held on 17 April 1982,
subject to the full range of regulations in existence then. This approach
222

Supra, footnote 1 . The constitutional provisions are discussed in : Slattery, loc.
cit., footnote 91 ; Slattery, loc .- cit ., footnote 140; K.M . Lysyk, The Rights and Freedoms of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada, in W.S . Tarnopolsky and G.-A. Beaudoin
(eds .), The .Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982), pp . 467-488; Hogg, op .
cit., footnote 175, Chap . 24 ; K. McNeil, The Constitutional Rights of the Aboriginal
Peoples of Canada (1982), 4 Sup. Ct . L. Rev. 25 5; D . Sanders, The Rights of the
Aboriginal Peoples of Canada (1983), 61 Can. Bar Rev. 314; G. Emery, Reflexions sur
le sens et la portée au Québec des articles 25, 35, et 37 de la Loi constitutionnelle de
1982 (1985), 25 C . de D. 145; 3. O'Reilly, La Loi constitutionnelle de 1982, droit des
autochtones (1984), 25 C. de D. 125. For recent jurisprudence on section 35, see, for
example, R. v. Eninew (1983), 1 D.L .R . (4th) 595 (Sask. Q.B .), aff'd. (1984), 10
D.L .R . (4th) 137 (Sask. C.A .) ; R. v. Horse, [1984] 4 C.N .L .R . 99 (Sask. C.A .) ; R. v.
Adams, [1985] 4 C.N .L .R. 123 (Que . C.S .P.), [1985] 4 C.N .L .R . 39 (Que . S.C .);
Sparrow v. R., [1987] 2 W.W.R . 577 (B .C .C .A .) .
223 See
discussion in Slattery, loc. cit., footnote 140, at pp . 376-387.
224
Compare the following discussion with the analysis of the British Columbia
Court of Appeal in Sparrow v. R., supra, footnote 222.
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reads into the Constitution the myriad of regulations affecting the exercise of aboriginal rights, regulations that differed considerably from place
to place across the country . It does not permit differentiation between
regulations of long-term significance and those enacted to deal with temporary conditions, or between reasonable and unreasonable restrictions .
Moreover, it might require that a constitutional amendment be enacted
to implement regulations more stringent than those in existence on 17
April 1982 . This solution seems unsatisfactory .
An alternative approach is to hold that section 35(1) recognizes
unextinguished aboriginal rights in their original form, so that any regulations restricting their exercise are invalid. This approach leads to extreme
consequences . It suggests, for example, that regulations implementing
basic safety precautions in hunting, or protecting a rare species of animal might be invalid. It seems, moreover, inconsistent with the word
"existing", which suggests that the rights in question are affirmed in a
contemporary form rather than in their primeval simplicity and vigour .
The desirable solution, then, lies between these two extremes . It is
submitted that section 35(1) permits a court to uphold certain regulations
in existence at the commencement date, while striking down others, and
allows legislatures a limited power of regulation in the future . The governing criteria should be worked out-on a case by case basis . But, at the
least, the following sorts of regulations would be valid: (1) regulations
that operate to preserve or advance section 35 rights (as by conserving a
natural resource essential to the exercise of such rights); (2) regulations
that prevent the exercise of section 35 rights from causing serious harm
to the general populace or native peoples themselves (such as standard
safety restrictions governing the use of fire-arms in hunting), 225 and (3)
regulations that implement state policies of overriding importance to the
general welfare (as in times of war or emergency) .
Conclusion

From early colonial days, the doctrine of aboriginal rights has formed
part of the basic constitutional structure of Canada . It originated in principles of colonial law that defined the relationship between the British
Crown and the native peoples of Canada and the status of their lands,
laws, and existing political structures . Some of those principles were
articulated in the Royal Proclamation of 1763, and were reflected in
treaties concluded between the Crown and particular native groups . At
Confederation, they passed into the federal sphere, and formed a body
of basic common law principles operating across Canada . In principle,
these principles were liable to be overriden by legislation. However,
For analogous holdings in other contexts, see: Myran v . The Queen, [1976] 2
S.C .R . 137, (1975), 58 D.L .R . (3d) 1 ; R. v. Napoleon, [1985] 6 W.W .R . 302 (B .C .C .A .) .
225
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they were protected in part by the provisions of constitutional instruments such as the Proclamation of 1763, and the Constitution Act, 1867.
With the enactment of the Constitution Act in 1952, they have become
constitutionally entrenched .
The Constitution Act, 1982 signifies more than a mere mechanical
adjustment in the doctrine of aboriginal rights, protecting it henceforth
from legislative inroads . It represents a conscious political act whereby
the people of an independent Canada reaffirm the values implicit in
the doctrine . In 1969, when the government of Canada issued its famous
White Paper on Indian policy, it was possible to view aboriginal rights
as the embarrassing relics of a half-forgotten colonial past, to be interred
as quickly and decently as possible, and certainly not to be taken as the
basis for modern governmental policies . 22s The remarkable reaction of
native communities across the country to the White Paper demonstrated
that what was mere history for some was a matter of life or death for
others . So, when section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, recognizes
and affirms the existing aboriginal rights of the aboriginal peoples of
Canada it constitutes a significant step toward the acceptance of the
_native point of view .
But there is a danger that section 35 can become a legal prison,
locking native peoples into historically-based structures that impede them
from playing their proper role in modern Canadian society. This danger
can be averted only by interpreting the section in the light of the fundamental values that inform it. A full discussion of these matters must be
left to another occasion . Briefly, however, it may be suggested that two
major considerations lie at the foundation of section 35. First, basic
historical commitments made to native peoples should not be lightly
overturned, and generally not without their consent. These commitments
may at times have been ill-considered, and they may not always have
been in the best interests of native peoples themselves. But they are the
basis upon which native peoples entered Canadian society, and which
gave them a stable foothold in an often difficult struggle to survive . If
these commitments are now to be changed, native peoples must be fully
involved in the process of renegotiation. Second, native Canadians are
not just people who happen to have a heritage differing from that of the
majority of Canadians, one more ingredient in the cultural potpourri of
modern Canada. In ways that we may not fully recognize or appreciate,
native Canadians represent our society's only deep historical links to the
land, consolidated over millenia . If their land is now our land as well,
their relationship with that land is particularly worthy of understanding
and respect.
... See, S. Weaver, Making Canadian Indian-Policy: The Hidden Agenda, 1968-1970
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